Zio has SubFileSystem Path Confinement Bypass via Unresolved `..` Segment

Summary

SubFileSystem fails to confine operations to its declared sub path when the input path is /../ (or equivalents /../, /..\\). This path passes all validation but resolves to the root of the parent filesystem, allowing directory level operations outside the intended boundary.

Affected Component

Zio.UPath.ValidateAndNormalize Zio.FileSystems.SubFileSystem

UPath.ValidateAndNormalize has a trailing slash optimisation.

if (!processParts && i + 1 == path.Length)
    return path.Substring(0, path.Length - 1);

When the input ends with / or \, and processParts is still false, the function strips the trailing separator and returns immediately before the .. resolution logic runs. The input /../ triggers this path: the trailing / is the last character, processParts has not been set (because .. as the first relative segment after root is specifically exempted), so the function returns /.. with the .. segment unresolved.

The resulting UPath with FullName = "/.." is absolute, contains no control characters, and no colon so it passes FileSystem.ValidatePath without rejection.

When this path reaches SubFileSystem.ConvertPathToDelegate:

protected override UPath ConvertPathToDelegate(UPath path)
{
    var safePath = path.ToRelative();     // "/..".ToRelative() = ".."
    return SubPath / safePath;            // "/jail" / ".." = "/"  (resolved by Combine)
}

The delegate filesystem receives / (the root) instead of a path under /jail.

Proof of Concept

using Zio;
using Zio.FileSystems;

var root = new MemoryFileSystem();
root.CreateDirectory("/sandbox");
var sub = new SubFileSystem(root, "/sandbox");

Console.WriteLine(sub.DirectoryExists("/../"));           // True (sees parent root)
Console.WriteLine(sub.ConvertPathToInternal("/../"));     // "/" (parent root path)

Impact

The escape is limited to directory level operations because appending a filename after .. (e.g., /../file.txt) causes normal .. resolution to trigger, which correctly rejects the path as going above root. Only the bare terminal /../ (which strips to /..) survives. This means that exploitability is limited, and this vulnerability does not escalate to file read/write.