CKAN MCP Server: Cache-key canonicalization collision enables cache confusion / poisoning

Summary

The response cache derives its key from an ambiguous string serialization of the request parameters. canonicalizeParams joins sorted ${key}=${value} pairs with & and does not escape &, =, or the | field separators used in buildCacheKey. Two different logical parameter sets can therefore serialize to the same key and share one cache entry. Because the cached value is whatever the upstream returned for whichever request populated the entry first, an attacker can prime a colliding key so a victim's distinct query (same server_url) is served the attacker's cached response.

Affected code

// src/utils/cache.ts
export function canonicalizeParams(params) {
  const keys = Object.keys(params).sort();
  const pairs = [];
  for (const key of keys) {
    const value = params[key];
    if (value === undefined || value === null) continue;
    const serialized = typeof value === "object" ? JSON.stringify(value) : String(value);
    pairs.push(`${key}=${serialized}`);        // value not escaped
  }
  return pairs.join("&");                        // '&' delimiter, injectable
}

export async function buildCacheKey(serverUrl, action, params) {
  const raw = `${serverUrl}|${action}|${canonicalizeParams(params)}`;  // '|' also unescaped
  return sha1Hex(raw);
}

Confirmed collisions (identical key):

• { q: "budget", rows: 10 } ≡ { q: "budget&rows=10" } → both canonicalize to q=budget&rows=10
• { filters: { a: "b" } } ≡ { filters: '{"a":"b"}' } → both canonicalize to filters={"a":"b"} (object-vs-string ambiguity)

An attacker can reproduce any target canonical string by injecting it into the alphabetically-first parameter, so the collision is general, not incidental.

Impact

• Cache poisoning / confusion. On a shared cache (caching is enabled by default; the Cloudflare Workers deployment uses the shared caches.default, and a Node HTTP instance shares one in-process LRU across all clients), an attacker primes a colliding entry so that another client's genuinely different query receives the attacker-chosen response for the same portal.
• Integrity of results. Victims receive data for a query they did not make (wrong dataset list, wrong record set), undermining trust in tool output.
• Chains with indirect prompt injection (advisory #07). The attacker's colliding request can be one whose upstream response surfaces an attacker-controlled dataset (with malicious notes/title); the victim's benign query then serves that poisoned content to the model — delivering prompt injection via the cache, without the victim ever querying the malicious dataset.

Confidentiality impact is low (same-portal public data); the primary damage is integrity. AC:H reflects the need for caching to be enabled and a shared instance plus priming before the victim's request populates the entry.

Proof of concept

poc/cache-collision-poc.mjs primes a single-param request and shows a victim's distinct two-param request being served the attacker-primed entry:

attacker canonical : q=budget&rows=10
victim   canonical : q=budget&rows=10
same cache key      : true
victim served from cache: true
victim RECEIVED    : RESULT_FOR({"q":"budget&rows=10"})
victim EXPECTED    : RESULT_FOR({"q":"budget","rows":10})

Remediation

• Build the cache key from an unambiguous, injection-proof encoding: hash a structured, canonical JSON (with typed values) or percent-encode/escape each key and value before joining, and use a separator that cannot appear in the encoded fields. Include a type tag so {a:{...}} (object) and {a:"..."} (string) never coincide.
• Consider partitioning the cache per client/tenant on shared deployments so one client cannot influence another's entries.