rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs
Summary
The /credentials/signurl endpoint decides authorization from the client-supplied X-Rucio-Account HTTP header instead of the authenticated token's account. Any client holding any valid auth token (even a low-privilege account they legitimately own) can send X-Rucio-Account: root to pass the root-only permission check and have the Rucio server mint a presigned read / write / delete URL for an arbitrary object, signed with the RSE's stored S3 / GCS / Swift credentials.
Details
SignURL.get() takes the authorization principal from a request header and never uses the token-authenticated identity:
# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/credentials.py
account = request.headers.get('X-Rucio-Account', default=None) # L165 (attacker-controlled)
...
result = get_signed_url(account, rse=rse, service=service, # L194
operation=operation, url=url, lifetime=lifetime, vo=vo)
The gateway then uses that header value as the issuer for the permission check:
# lib/rucio/gateway/credential.py
auth_result = permission.has_permission(issuer=account, vo=vo, # L57
action='get_signed_url', kwargs=kwargs, ...)
and the permission function is root-only:
# lib/rucio/core/permission/generic.py
def perm_get_signed_url(issuer, kwargs, session):
return _is_root(issuer) # _is_root(x) -> x.external == 'root'
InternalAccount('root', vo).external == 'root' unconditionally, so the gate passes whenever the header is root. The endpoint is on AuthenticatedBlueprint, whose before_request hook validates the token and sets request.environ['issuer'] from the token — but nothing ever compares X-Rucio-Account to it:
# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/common.py (request_auth_env)
flask.request.environ['issuer'] = auth.get('account') # L168 (the real account; unused by SignURL)
This is anomalous: every other authenticated handler derives the account from request.environ['issuer']; credentials.py is the only one that trusts the header. Additionally, core.credential.get_signed_url never checks that the supplied url's host/bucket belongs to the target RSE, so even a legitimate root caller gets an arbitrary-object signing oracle. In multi-VO the VO is also read from the X-Rucio-VO header, allowing cross-tenant targeting.
Proof of concept
Request (any valid token + spoofed account):
GET /credentials/signurl?rse=<cloudRSE>&svc=s3&op=delete&url=https://victim-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/important/dataset.root HTTP/1.1
X-Rucio-Auth-Token: <any valid token, even a low-privilege account>
X-Rucio-Account: root
Accept: application/octet-stream
Response: 200 OK with a presigned DELETE URL the attacker replays directly against the storage backend.
Impact
A low-privilege Rucio user can read, overwrite, and delete arbitrary objects on any cloud-backed (S3/GCS/Swift) RSE using the server's stored credentials — enabling data exfiltration, tampering, and destruction, and cross-tenant access in multi-VO deployments.
Credit
Reported by seankohjs. Found via static analysis + manual verification.
What to do
Upgrade rucio to version 35.9.0, 38.6.0, 41.0.0rc1, or later.
Affected software
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| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | rucio | >= 1.16.1, < 35.9.0, >= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.0, >= 39.0.0rc1, < 41.0.0rc1 | 35.9.0, 38.6.0, 41.0.0rc1 |
References
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/commit/64c0e6a6a93ae88427ff3b7d77532ce08c8a69ec
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/commit/8bdc38994a8766658d0314d36afc104c9242c96f
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/commit/8d9ba31514e6f5dca32b8c1db4738582cb37ec3a
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/35.9.0
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/38.6.0
- https://github.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/41.0.0rc1
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-639- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
rucio- Disclosed
- 28.10.2026
- Updated
- 03.11.2026 10:00
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: rucio
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 4
- First → latest
- 05.2026 11.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 3
- High 1
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 4
-
rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs this entry
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