High

rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs

  • Disclosed: 28.10.2026
  • Updated: 03.11.2026 10:00

Summary

The /credentials/signurl endpoint decides authorization from the client-supplied X-Rucio-Account HTTP header instead of the authenticated token's account. Any client holding any valid auth token (even a low-privilege account they legitimately own) can send X-Rucio-Account: root to pass the root-only permission check and have the Rucio server mint a presigned read / write / delete URL for an arbitrary object, signed with the RSE's stored S3 / GCS / Swift credentials.

Details

SignURL.get() takes the authorization principal from a request header and never uses the token-authenticated identity:

python
# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/credentials.py
account = request.headers.get('X-Rucio-Account', default=None)     # L165  (attacker-controlled)
...
result = get_signed_url(account, rse=rse, service=service,         # L194
                        operation=operation, url=url, lifetime=lifetime, vo=vo)

The gateway then uses that header value as the issuer for the permission check:

python
# lib/rucio/gateway/credential.py
auth_result = permission.has_permission(issuer=account, vo=vo,     # L57
                                        action='get_signed_url', kwargs=kwargs, ...)

and the permission function is root-only:

python
# lib/rucio/core/permission/generic.py
def perm_get_signed_url(issuer, kwargs, session):
    return _is_root(issuer)        # _is_root(x) -> x.external == 'root'

InternalAccount('root', vo).external == 'root' unconditionally, so the gate passes whenever the header is root. The endpoint is on AuthenticatedBlueprint, whose before_request hook validates the token and sets request.environ['issuer'] from the token — but nothing ever compares X-Rucio-Account to it:

python
# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/common.py  (request_auth_env)
flask.request.environ['issuer'] = auth.get('account')             # L168  (the real account; unused by SignURL)

This is anomalous: every other authenticated handler derives the account from request.environ['issuer']; credentials.py is the only one that trusts the header. Additionally, core.credential.get_signed_url never checks that the supplied url's host/bucket belongs to the target RSE, so even a legitimate root caller gets an arbitrary-object signing oracle. In multi-VO the VO is also read from the X-Rucio-VO header, allowing cross-tenant targeting.

Proof of concept

Request (any valid token + spoofed account):

GET /credentials/signurl?rse=<cloudRSE>&svc=s3&op=delete&url=https://victim-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/important/dataset.root HTTP/1.1
X-Rucio-Auth-Token: <any valid token, even a low-privilege account>
X-Rucio-Account: root
Accept: application/octet-stream

Response: 200 OK with a presigned DELETE URL the attacker replays directly against the storage backend.

Impact

A low-privilege Rucio user can read, overwrite, and delete arbitrary objects on any cloud-backed (S3/GCS/Swift) RSE using the server's stored credentials — enabling data exfiltration, tampering, and destruction, and cross-tenant access in multi-VO deployments.

Credit

Reported by seankohjs. Found via static analysis + manual verification.

What to do

Upgrade rucio to version 35.9.0, 38.6.0, 41.0.0rc1, or later.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Python (PyPI) rucio >= 1.16.1, < 35.9.0, >= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.0, >= 39.0.0rc1, < 41.0.0rc1 35.9.0, 38.6.0, 41.0.0rc1

References

CVSS score 8.8/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-639
Platform
Python (PyPI)
Package
rucio
Disclosed
28.10.2026
Updated
03.11.2026 10:00

Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: rucio

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

Total entries
4
First → latest
05.2026 11.2026
Without a fix
0
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • Critical 3
  • High 1

Disclosures per year

  1. 2026: 4
  1. Critical · 9.8 CVE-2026-100397 >= 1.14.0.post1, < 35.9.1, >= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.1, >= 39.0.0rc1, < 40.4.2, >= 41.0.0rc1, < 41.1.1 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, 41.1.1
  2. rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs this entry
    High · 8.8 CVE-2026-58273 >= 1.16.1, < 35.9.0, >= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.0, >= 39.0.0rc1, < 41.0.0rc1 35.9.0, 38.6.0, 41.0.0rc1
  3. Critical · 9.9 CVE-2026-29090 >= 1.30.0, < 35.8.5, >= 36.0.0, < 38.5.5, >= 39.0.0, < 39.4.2, >= 40.0.0, < 40.1.1 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, 40.1.1
  4. Critical · 9.9 CVE-2026-29080 >= 1.27.0, < 35.8.5, >= 36.0.0, < 38.5.5, >= 39.0.0, < 39.4.2, >= 40.0.0, < 40.1.1 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, 40.1.1

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