High

Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Translation Grid Date Filter via Unsanitized Property Parameter

  • Disclosed: 27.05.2026
  • Updated: 11.10.2026 10:22

GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369

Summary

SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied property field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...))) SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.

Severity

CVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Component

  • Package: pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
  • File: src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
  • Lines: 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point)
  • Endpoint: POST /admin/translation/translations

Description

The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has type: "date", the property field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression:

php
$fieldname = $filter[$propertyField];              // Line 565 — user input
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);    // Line 569 — trivially bypassable
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;        // Line 577
$fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";  // Line 593 — injection

The str_replace('--', '') sanitization is trivially bypassable (use /**/ comments or ----). In non-language mode, $fieldname is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization.

Impact

Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain.

Proof of Concept

POST /admin/translation/translations
filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}]

Suggested Fix

Validate $fieldname against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation:

php
$allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) {
    continue;
}

References

  • CWE-89: SQL Injection
  • Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path)

Suggested Fix

In TranslationController.php: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname}))) with $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname) to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions.

diff
--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
 
                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
                 if (!$languageMode) {
                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
                 }
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
                             $operator = '=';
-                            $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+                            // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
                         }

Proposed Fix

diff
--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
 
                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
                 if (!$languageMode) {
                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
                 }
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
                             $operator = '=';
-                            $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+                            // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
                         }

Happy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Composer package pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle >= 2.0.0-RC1, < 2.3.6, < 1.7.18 2.3.6, 1.7.18

References

CVSS score 8.8/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-89
Platform
Composer
Package
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
Disclosed
27.05.2026
Updated
11.10.2026 10:22

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92 - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Composer package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

All (17) in the archive
Total entries
17
First → latest
07.2023 05.2026
Without a fix
0
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • High 6
  • Medium 10
  • Low 1

Disclosures per year

  1. 2023: 6
  2. 2024: 7
  3. 2025: 2
  4. 2026: 2
Severity:
  1. Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Translation Grid Date Filter via Unsanitized Property Parameter this entry
    High · 8.8 CVE-2026-44741 >= 2.0.0-RC1, < 2.3.6, < 1.7.18 2.3.6, 1.7.18
  2. High · 8.8 ghsa-hq76-662x-7mw4 < 1.3.11, >= 1.4.0, < 1.4.7, >= 1.5.0, < 1.5.4 1.3.11, 1.4.7, 1.5.4
  3. High · 8.1 CVE-2024-25625 < 1.3.4 1.3.4
  4. High · 8.8 CVE-2024-23648 < 1.2.3 1.2.3
  5. High · 8.8 CVE-2024-23646 >= 1.0.0, < 1.3.2 1.3.2

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