Glances has Incomplete Secrets Redaction: /api/v4/args Endpoint Leaks Password Hash and SNMP Credentials
Summary
The GHSA-gh4x fix (commit 5d3de60) addressed unauthenticated configuration secrets exposure on the /api/v4/config endpoints by introducing as_dict_secure() redaction. However, the /api/v4/args and /api/v4/args/{item} endpoints were not addressed by this fix. These endpoints return the complete command-line arguments namespace via vars(self.args), which includes the password hash (salt + pbkdf2_hmac), SNMP community strings, SNMP authentication keys, and the configuration file path. When Glances runs without --password (the default), these endpoints are accessible without any authentication.
Details
The secrets exposure fix (GHSA-gh4x, commit 5d3de60) modified three config-related endpoints to use as_dict_secure() when no password is configured:
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:1168 (FIXED)
args_json = self.config.as_dict() if self.args.password else self.config.as_dict_secure()
However, the _api_args and _api_args_item endpoints were not part of this fix and still return all arguments without any sanitization:
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:1222-1237
def _api_args(self):
try:
# Get the RAW value of the args dict
# Use vars to convert namespace to dict
args_json = vars(self.args)
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, f"Cannot get args ({str(e)})")
return GlancesJSONResponse(args_json)
And the item-specific endpoint:
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:1239-1258
def _api_args_item(self, item: str):
...
args_json = vars(self.args)[item]
return GlancesJSONResponse(args_json)
The self.args namespace contains sensitive fields set during initialization in glances/main.py:
-
password(line 806-819): When--passwordis used, this contains the salt + pbkdf2_hmac hash. An attacker can use this for offline brute-force attacks. -
snmp_community(line 445): Default"public", but may be set to a secret community string for SNMP monitoring. -
snmp_user(line 448): SNMP v3 username, default"private". -
snmp_auth(line 450): SNMP v3 authentication key, default"password"but typically set to a secret value. -
conf_file(line 198): Path to the configuration file, reveals filesystem structure. -
username(line 430/800): The Glances authentication username.
Both endpoints are registered on the authenticated router (line 504-505):
f'{base_path}/args': self._api_args,
f'{base_path}/args/{{item}}': self._api_args_item,
When --password is not set (the default), the router has NO authentication dependency (line 479-480), making these endpoints completely unauthenticated:
if self.args.password:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])
else:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix)
PoC
Scenario 1: No password configured (default deployment)
# Start Glances in web server mode (default, no password)
glances -w
# Access all command line arguments without authentication
curl -s http://localhost:61208/api/4/args | python -m json.tool
# Expected output includes sensitive fields:
# "password": "",
# "snmp_community": "public",
# "snmp_user": "private",
# "snmp_auth": "password",
# "username": "glances",
# "conf_file": "/home/user/.config/glances/glances.conf",
# Access specific sensitive argument
curl -s http://localhost:61208/api/4/args/snmp_community
curl -s http://localhost:61208/api/4/args/snmp_auth
Scenario 2: Password configured (authenticated deployment)
# Start Glances with password authentication
glances -w --password --username admin
# Authenticate and access args (password hash exposed to authenticated users)
curl -s -u admin:mypassword http://localhost:61208/api/4/args/password
# Returns the salt$pbkdf2_hmac hash which enables offline brute-force
Impact
-
Unauthenticated network reconnaissance: When Glances runs without
--password(the common default for internal/trusted networks), anyone who can reach the web server can enumerate SNMP credentials, usernames, file paths, and all runtime configuration. -
Offline password cracking: When authentication is enabled, an authenticated user can retrieve the password hash (salt + pbkdf2_hmac) and perform offline brute-force attacks. The hash uses pbkdf2_hmac with SHA-256 and 100,000 iterations (see
glances/password.py:45), which provides some protection but is still crackable with modern hardware. -
Lateral movement: Exposed SNMP community strings and v3 authentication keys can be used to access other network devices monitored by the Glances instance.
-
Supply chain for CORS attack: Combined with the default CORS misconfiguration (finding 001), these secrets can be stolen cross-origin by a malicious website.
Recommended Fix
Apply the same redaction pattern used for the /api/v4/config endpoints:
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py
_SENSITIVE_ARGS = frozenset({
'password', 'snmp_community', 'snmp_user', 'snmp_auth',
'conf_file', 'password_prompt', 'username_used',
})
def _api_args(self):
try:
args_json = vars(self.args).copy()
if not self.args.password:
for key in _SENSITIVE_ARGS:
if key in args_json:
args_json[key] = "********"
# Never expose the password hash, even to authenticated users
if 'password' in args_json and args_json['password']:
args_json['password'] = "********"
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, f"Cannot get args ({str(e)})")
return GlancesJSONResponse(args_json)
def _api_args_item(self, item: str):
if item not in self.args:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, f"Unknown argument item {item}")
try:
if item in _SENSITIVE_ARGS:
if not self.args.password:
return GlancesJSONResponse("********")
if item == 'password':
return GlancesJSONResponse("********")
args_json = vars(self.args)[item]
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, f"Cannot get args item ({str(e)})")
return GlancesJSONResponse(args_json)
Affected software
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| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | glances | < 4.5.2 | 4.5.2 |
References
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/ff14eb9780ee10ec018c754754b1c8c7bfb6c44f
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-cvwp-r2g2-j824
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32609
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-200- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
glances- Disclosed
- 16.03.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 14:17
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-2168 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-cvwp-r2g2-j824 - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: glances
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 26
- First → latest
- 07.2021 08.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 1
- High 19
- Medium 6
Disclosures per year
- 2021: 1
- 2022: 0
- 2023: 0
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 25
-
Glances has Incomplete Secrets Redaction: /api/v4/args Endpoint Leaks Password Hash and SNMP Credentials this entry
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