Medium

biscuit-java vulnerable to public key confusion in third party block

  • Disclosed: 31.07.2024
  • Updated: 11.10.2026 12:21

Impact

Tokens with third-party blocks containing trusted annotations generated through a third party block request. Due to implementation issues in biscuit-java, third party block support in published versions is inoperating. Nevertheless, to synchronize with other implementations, we publish this advisory and the related fix.

Description

Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a ThirdPartyBlock request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it:

the public key of the previous block (used in the signature) the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions) A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair.

Consider the following example (nominal case)

  • Authority A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}
  • The well-behaving holder then generates a third-party block request based on the token and sends it to third-party authority B
  • Third-party B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}
  • The token holder now must obtain a third-party block from third party C to be able to use the token

Now, with a malicious user:

  • Authority A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}
  • The holder then attenuates the token with the following third party block thirdparty("c"), signed with a keypair pubkeyD, privkeyD) they generate
  • The holder then generates a third-party block request based on this token, but alter the ThirdPartyBlockRequest publicKeys field and replace pubkeyD with pubkeyC
  • Third-party B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}
  • Due to the altered symbol table, the actual meaning of the block is thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyD}
  • The attacker can now use the token without obtaining a third-party block from C.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

References

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Affected software

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PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Java / Kotlin (Maven) org.biscuitsec:biscuit >= 3.0.0, < 4.0.0 4.0.0

References

CVSS score 3/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-1259
Platform
Java / Kotlin (Maven)
Package
org.biscuitsec:biscuit
Disclosed
31.07.2024
Updated
11.10.2026 12:21

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-5hcj-rwm6-xmw4 - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: org.biscuitsec:biscuit

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Java / Kotlin (Maven)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

This is the only known vulnerability of this package.

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