mindsdb arbitrary file write when extracting a remotely retrieved Tarball
Summary
An unsafe extraction is being performed using tarfile.extractall() from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. Sometimes, the vulnerability is called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant.
Details
I commented the following snippet of code as a vulnerability details. The code is from file.py#L26..L134
@ns_conf.route('/<name>')
@ns_conf.param('name', "MindsDB's name for file")
class File(Resource):
@ns_conf.doc('put_file')
def put(self, name: str):
''' add new file
params in FormData:
- file
- original_file_name [optional]
'''
data = {}
... omitted for brevity
url = data['source']
data['file'] = data['name']
... omitted for brevity
with requests.get(url, stream=True) as r: # Source: retrieve the URL which point to a remotely located tarball
if r.status_code != 200:
return http_error(
400,
"Error getting file",
f"Got status code: {r.status_code}"
)
file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])
with open(file_path, 'wb') as f:
for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=8192): # write with chunks the remote retrieved file into file_path location
f.write(chunk)
original_file_name = data.get('original_file_name')
file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])
lp = file_path.lower()
if lp.endswith(('.zip', '.tar.gz')):
if lp.endswith('.zip'):
with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path) as f:
f.extractall(temp_dir_path)
elif lp.endswith('.tar.gz'):
with tarfile.open(file_path) as f: # Just after
f.extractall(temp_dir_path) # Sink: the tarball located by file_path is supposed to be extracted to temp_dir_path.
So, a remotely available tarball is being retrieved and written to the server filesystem in chunks, and then, if the extension ends with .tar.gz of a compressed tarball, the mindsdb app applies tarfile.extractall() directly with no checks for the destination.
However, according to the following warning from the official documentation;
Warning: Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. It is possible that files are created outside of path, e.g. members that have absolute filenames starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..".
PoC
The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file sim4n6.txt to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.
> tar --list -v -f archive.tar.gz
tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names
../../../sim4n6.txt
> python3
Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import tarfile
>>> with tarfile.open("archive.tar.gz") as tf:
>>> tf.extractall()
>>> exit()
> test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists"
sim4n6.txt exists
Attack Scenario
An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely, proceed to the PUT request of the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server for instance.
Mitigation
Potential mitigation could be to:
- Use a safer module, like
zipfile. - Use an alternative of
tarfile, such astarsafe. - Validate the location or the absolute path of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path
../../..or absolute path such as/etc/password. A simple wrapper could be written to raise an exception when a path traversal may be identified.
This is similar to the other report GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | mindsdb | < 23.2.1.0 | 23.2.1.0 |
References
- https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/releases/tag/v23.2.1.0
- https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx
- https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/commit/4419b0f0019c000db390b54d8b9d06e1d3670039
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30620
- https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb
- https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/afedd37c16e579b6dc075b0814e42d0505ccdc07/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py#L26..L134
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mindsdb/PYSEC-2023-27.yaml
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-22- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
mindsdb- Disclosed
- 30.03.2023
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 15:17
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2023-27 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: mindsdb
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 22
- First → latest
- 03.2023 05.2026
- Without a fix
- 7
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 1
- High 16
- Medium 5
Disclosures per year
- 2023: 5
- 2024: 13
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 4
-
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