Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked
Assessment
The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.
Original report
Summary
fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook().
Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.
Root cause
run_hook() patches only:
pickle.loadpickle.Unpickler_pickle.Unpickler
It does not patch:
pickle.loads_pickle.load_pickle.loads
Reproduction (clean upstream)
import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError
class Payload:
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))
data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()
# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
pickle.loads(data)
print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True
# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
try:
pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
except UnsafeFileError:
pass
print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False
Observed on vulnerable code:
pickle.loadsexecutes payloadpickle.loadis blocked
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
def run_hook():
- pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.load = loader.load
+ _pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.loads = loader.loads
+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads
Validation after patch
pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loadall raiseUnsafeFileError- sink not called in any path
Regression tests added locally:
test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loadstest_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loadsintest/test_security_regressions_20260303.py
Impact
High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.
Czego dotyczy
Kliknij technologię, aby zobaczyć wszystkie dotyczące jej podatności.
| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | fickling | < 0.1.9 | 0.1.9 |
Odnośniki
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-693- Platforma
- Python (PyPI)
- Paczka
fickling- Ujawniono
- 04.03.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 12:19
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448 - CC BY 4.0
Historia podatności: fickling
Wszystkie opisane podatności tej paczki (Python (PyPI)), od najnowszej. Widać, czy to jednorazowa wpadka, czy paczka, której trzeba pilnować.
- Wszystkich wpisów
- 16
- Pierwsza → ostatnia
- 12.2025 07.2026
- Bez poprawki
- 0
- Wykorzystywana w atakach
- 0
Rozkład istotności
- Krytyczna 1
- Wysoka 11
- Średnia 3
- Niska 1
Ujawnienia w latach
- 2025: 2
- 2026: 14
-
Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked ten wpis
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