OpenClaw: Node reconnect metadata spoofing could bypass platform-based node command policy

Summary

A paired node device could reconnect with spoofed platform/deviceFamily metadata and broaden node command policy eligibility because reconnect metadata was accepted from the client while these fields were not bound into the device-auth signature.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: <= 2026.2.25
• Latest published version at update time: 2026.2.25
• Patched version (pre-set for next release): 2026.2.26

Impact

In configurations where node command policy differs by platform, an attacker with an already paired node identity on the trusted network could spoof reconnect metadata and gain access to commands that should remain blocked for the originally paired platform.

Fix

• Add device-auth payload v3 that signs normalized platform and deviceFamily.
• Verify v3 first (fallback to v2 for compatibility), while pinning paired metadata server-side.
• Reject reconnect metadata mismatches and require explicit repair pairing to change pinned metadata.
• Add regression coverage for reconnect spoof attempts.

Fix Commit(s)

• 7d8aeaaf06e2e616545d2c2cec7fa27f36b59b6a

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release 2026.2.26; once that npm release is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @76embiid21 for reporting.