OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions
Summary
Inter-session messages sent via sessions_send could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as role: "user" without provenance metadata.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.12(i.e.< 2026.2.13) - Fixed in:
2026.2.13(patched versions>= 2026.2.13)
Impact
A delegated or internal session could inject instructions into another session that appeared equivalent to externally-originated user input.
This is an instruction-provenance confusion issue (confused-deputy style), which can lead to unintended privileged behavior in workflows that trust role: "user" as a sole authority signal.
Technical details
Before the fix, routed inter-session prompts were stored as regular user turns without a verifiable source marker.
As a result, downstream workers and transcript readers could not distinguish:
- External user input
- Internal inter-session routed input
Fix
OpenClaw now carries explicit input provenance end-to-end for routed prompts.
Key changes:
- Added structured provenance model (
inputProvenance) withkindvalues includinginter_session. sessions_sendand agent-to-agent steps now set inter-session provenance when invoking target runs.- Provenance is persisted on user messages as
message.provenance.kind = "inter_session"(role remainsuserfor provider compatibility). - Transcript readers and memory helpers were updated to respect provenance and avoid treating inter-session prompts as external user-originated input.
- Runtime context rebuilding now annotates inter-session turns with an explicit in-memory marker (
[Inter-session message]) for clearer model-side disambiguation. - Regression tests were added for transcript parsing, session tools flow, runner sanitization, and memory hook behavior.
Fix Commit(s)
85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797
Workarounds
If immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Disable or restrict
sessions_sendin affected environments. - Do not use role alone as an authority boundary; require provenance-aware checks in orchestration logic.
Credit
Reported by @anbecker.
Thanks @anbecker for reporting.
Czego dotyczy
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| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paczka npm | openclaw | < 2026.2.13 | 2026.2.13 |
Odnośniki
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-345- Platforma
- npm
- Paczka
openclaw- Ujawniono
- 18.02.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645 - CC BY 4.0
Historia podatności: openclaw
Wszystkie opisane podatności tej paczki (Paczka npm), od najnowszej. Widać, czy to jednorazowa wpadka, czy paczka, której trzeba pilnować.
- Wszystkich wpisów
- 588
- Pierwsza → ostatnia
- 02.2026 07.2026
- Bez poprawki
- 9
- Wykorzystywana w atakach
- 0
Rozkład istotności
- Krytyczna 20
- Wysoka 215
- Średnia 299
- Niska 54
Ujawnienia w latach
- 2026: 588
-
OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions ten wpis
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