PHP JWT Framework: JWSVerifier uses algorithm from unprotected header, enabling algorithm confusion attacks
Summary
JWSVerifier::getAlgorithm() in src/Library/Signature/JWSVerifier.php (line 144) merges protected and unprotected headers using PHP's spread operator:
$completeHeader = [...$signature->getProtectedHeader(), ...$signature->getHeader()];
In PHP, when spreading arrays with duplicate string keys, the last array's values take precedence. Since the unprotected header (getHeader()) is spread second, an attacker can override the integrity-protected alg parameter by placing a different value in the unprotected header.
This creates a Time-of-Check/Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability:
HeaderCheckerManagervalidatesalgfrom the protected headerJWSVerifierusesalgfrom the unprotected header for actual verification
The same issue exists in JWEDecrypter.php (lines 120-124) where array_merge() exhibits the same last-wins behavior for alg and enc.
Affected Code
JWSVerifier.php line 144 — Spread operator merge order allows unprotected header to override alg:
$completeHeader = [...$signature->getProtectedHeader(), ...$signature->getHeader()];
JWEDecrypter.php lines 120-124 — array_merge() with same last-wins behavior:
$completeHeader = array_merge(
$jwe->getSharedProtectedHeader(),
$jwe->getSharedHeader(),
$recipient->getHeader()
);
Attack Vectors
Vector A — Mixed key sets (HIGH probability)
If the application uses a JWKSet containing keys of different types (common in multi-tenant or federation scenarios), the JWSVerifier iterates all keys (line 86). An attacker can force a different algorithm that matches a different key in the set.
Vector B — alg ONLY in unprotected header (HIGH probability)
If alg is placed EXCLUSIVELY in the unprotected header (not in the protected header at all), HeaderCheckerManager::checkDuplicatedHeaderParameters() does NOT trigger. The JSON Flattened/General serializers allow tokens with no protected header or a protected header without alg. RFC 7515 Section 4.1.1 states alg MUST be integrity-protected, but the library does not enforce this.
Vector C — Direct JWSVerifier usage (HIGH probability)
JWSLoader takes ?HeaderCheckerManager (nullable). If developers use JWSVerifier directly or create JWSLoader without a HeaderCheckerManager, the duplicate header check never runs.
Contrast with JWSBuilder (safe)
JWSBuilder::findSignatureAlgorithm() (line 196) uses [...$header, ...$protectedHeader] where protected wins. It also has checkDuplicatedHeaderParameters() (line 218). The JWSVerifier has neither safeguard.
Proof of Concept
<?php
// Demonstrate algorithm override via unprotected header
$protected = ["alg" => "RS256", "typ" => "JWT"];
$unprotected = ["alg" => "HS256"];
$merged = [...$protected, ...$unprotected];
// $merged["alg"] === "HS256" — unprotected wins!
// JSON Flattened JWS with algorithm override:
$maliciousJws = json_encode([
'payload' => base64url_encode($payload),
'protected' => base64url_encode('{"alg":"RS256"}'),
'header' => ['alg' => 'HS256'], // OVERRIDE
'signature' => base64url_encode($sig),
]);
// HeaderCheckerManager validates RS256 from protected header -> PASS
// JWSVerifier uses HS256 from unprotected header -> attacker's algorithm choice
A full working PoC demonstrating HS512-to-HS256 downgrade with mixed keysets is available upon request.
Suggested Fix
In JWSVerifier::getAlgorithm(), read alg exclusively from the protected header:
private function getAlgorithm(Signature $signature): Algorithm
{
$protectedHeader = $signature->getProtectedHeader();
if (! isset($protectedHeader['alg'])) {
throw new InvalidArgumentException('The "alg" parameter must be in the protected header.');
}
return $this->signatureAlgorithmManager->get($protectedHeader['alg']);
}
For JWEDecrypter, reverse the merge order so protected header wins, or extract alg/enc exclusively from the protected header.
Résolution
Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur 3.4.x, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).
JWS algorithm confusion — JWSVerifier lit le paramètre alg exclusivement dans le header protégé en intégrité (RFC 7515 §4.1.1) ; un alg placé dans le header non protégé ne peut plus surcharger l'algorithme signé.
Validation : php -l OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs 3.4.x), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue 3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x.
Czego dotyczy
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| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paczka Composer | web-token/jwt-bundle | < 3.4.10, >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7, >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7 | 3.4.10, 4.0.7, 4.1.7 |
| Paczka Composer | web-token/jwt-experimental | < 3.4.10, >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7, >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7 | 3.4.10, 4.0.7, 4.1.7 |
| Paczka Composer | web-token/jwt-framework | < 3.4.10, >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7, >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7 | 3.4.10, 4.0.7, 4.1.7 |
| Paczka Composer | web-token/jwt-library | < 3.4.10, >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7, >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7 | 3.4.10, 4.0.7, 4.1.7 |
Odnośniki
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-345- Platforma
- Composer
- Paczka
web-token/jwt-bundle, web-token/jwt-experimental, web-token/jwt-framework- Ujawniono
- 18.06.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-jc38-x7x8-2xc8 - CC BY 4.0
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