next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler
Impact
The HTTP route handler exported by next-video/request-handler — which the README instructs consumers to mount at /api/video — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary .json files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.
The handler's GET endpoint accepts a url query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for ^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, .json is appended, and the file is read with fs.readFile and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.
On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:
- The Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key (
.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json) - The Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys (
previewModeId,previewModeSigningKey,previewModeEncryptionKey) - Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths
- Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux
uploadId,assetId,playbackIdvalues stored invideos/*.json)
Any application that mounted /api/video following the documented one-liner is affected.
Patches
2.8.1
Workarounds
Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the url parameter before passing it through:
- Reject any
urlvalue that does not begin withhttps://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts. - Alternatively, remove the
/api/videoroute entirely if your application only uses build-timeimportof local video files and does not use<Video src="https://...">with string URLs at runtime.
References
src/request-handler.ts— the vulnerable GET handlersrc/assets.ts—getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurssrc/utils/utils.ts—isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branchessrc/config.ts—loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrainedfs.readFile
Czego dotyczy
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| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paczka npm | next-video | < 2.8.1 | 2.8.1 |
Odnośniki
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-200- Platforma
- npm
- Paczka
next-video- Ujawniono
- 20.08.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q - CC BY 4.0
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