vLLM: extract_hidden_states speculative decoding crashes server on any request with penalty parameters
Summary
The extract_hidden_states speculative decoding proposer in vLLM returns a tensor with an incorrect shape after the first decode step, causing a RuntimeError that crashes the EngineCore process. The crash is triggered when any request in the batch uses sampling penalty parameters (repetition_penalty, frequency_penalty, or presence_penalty).
A single request with a penalty parameter (e.g., "repetition_penalty": 1.1) is sufficient to crash the server. The crash is deterministic and immediate — no concurrency, race condition, or special workload is required.
Details
In vLLM v0.17.0, the extract_hidden_states proposer's propose() method returned sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1), producing a tensor of shape (batch_size, 1).
In PR #37013 (first released in v0.18.0), the KV connector interface was refactored out of propose(). The return type changed from tuple[Tensor, KVConnectorOutput | None] to Tensor, and the .unsqueeze(-1) call was removed along with the KV connector output:
# Before (v0.17.0):
return sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1), kv_connector_output # shape (batch_size, 1)
# After (v0.18.0+):
return sampled_token_ids # shape (batch_size, 2) after first decode step
The refactor missed that sampled_token_ids changed semantics between the first and subsequent decode steps. After the first decode step, the rejection sampler allocates its output as (batch_size, max_spec_len + 1). With num_speculative_tokens=1, this produces shape (batch_size, 2) instead of the expected (batch_size, 1), causing a broadcast shape mismatch during penalty application.
Impact
Any vLLM deployment between v0.18.0 and v0.19.1 (inclusive) configured with extract_hidden_states speculative decoding is affected. A single API request containing any penalty parameter immediately and permanently crashes the EngineCore process, resulting in complete loss of service availability.
Patches
Fixed in PR #38610, first included in vLLM v0.20.0. The fix slices the return value to sampled_token_ids[:, :1], ensuring the correct (batch_size, 1) shape regardless of the rejection sampler's output dimensions.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to vLLM v0.20.0 or later.
- If upgrading is not possible, avoid using
extract_hidden_statesas the speculative decoding method on affected versions. - Alternatively, reject or strip penalty parameters (
repetition_penalty,frequency_penalty,presence_penalty) from incoming requests at an API gateway before they reach vLLM.
Czego dotyczy
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| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | vllm | >= 0.18.0, < 0.20.0 | 0.20.0 |
Odnośniki
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-131, CWE-704- Platforma
- Python (PyPI)
- Paczka
vllm- Ujawniono
- 06.05.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 15:17
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-145 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-83vm-p52w-f9pw - CC BY 4.0
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