OpenClaw has a potential access-group authorization bypass if channel type lookup fails

Summary

When Telegram webhook mode is enabled without a configured webhook secret, OpenClaw may accept unauthenticated HTTP POST requests at the Telegram webhook endpoint and trust attacker-controlled update JSON. This can allow forged Telegram updates that spoof message.from.id / chat.id, potentially bypassing sender allowlists and executing privileged bot commands.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected: <= 2026.1.30
• Patched: >= 2026.2.1

Impact

An attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can forge Telegram updates and impersonate allowlisted/paired senders by spoofing fields in the webhook payload (for example message.from.id). Impact depends on enabled commands/tools and the deployment’s network exposure.

Mitigations / Workarounds

• Configure a strong channels.telegram.webhookSecret and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header unchanged.

Fix Commit(s)

• ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: webhookUrl requires webhookSecret)

Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes:

• 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)
• 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)
• 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)

Release Process Note

patched_versions is set to the first fixed release (2026.2.1).

Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.